## 1NC

### Topicality---1NC

#### The resolution should define the division of ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition. Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### ‘Antitrust laws’ are statutes.

Grimes ’20 [Charles W; 2020; editor of this Licensing Update and Law Professor at Ava Maria Law School; Wolters Kluwer, “Licensing Update,” https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf]

§13.02 ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Their ‘scope’ is defined by government.

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### Vote negative:

#### 1. Clash: debate requires a predictable topic to motivate in depth research that yields the values of negation and argument refinement. Their interp explodes limits, allows affirmative conditionality, and makes debate a one-sided monologue devoid of argumentation which turns the case.

#### 2. Fairness: the neg should win on average 50% of the time. Entering a competitive activity proves their arguments are shaped by a drive to win. The insurmountable advantage of being affirmative under their unfair model is a reason they should lose.

### Cap---1NC

#### Capitalism transforms individuals into ‘Nobodys’ that creates the conditions for state violence. Our critique does not deny the importance of identity, rather only an understanding of class as the mediating condition of oppression can make movements effective.

Marc L. Hill 16. Distinguished Professor of African American Studies at Morehouse College. *Nobody, Casualties of America’s War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond*. Atria Books. 17-20.

To be Nobody is to be abandoned by the State. For decades now, we have witnessed a radical transformation in the role and function of government in America. An obsession with free-market logic and culture has led the political class to craft policies that promote private interests over the public good. As a result, our schools, our criminal justice system, our military, our police departments, our public policy, and virtually every other entity engineered to protect life and enhance prosperity have been at least partially relocated to the private sector. At the same time, the private sector has kept its natural commitment to maximizing profits rather than investing in people. This arrangement has left the nation’s vulnerable wedged between the Scylla of negligent government and the Charybdis of corporate greed, trapped in a historically unprecedented state of precarity.

To be Nobody is to be considered disposable. In New Orleans, we saw the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina followed by a grossly unnatural government response, one that killed thousands of vulnerable citizens and consigned many more to refugee status. In Flint, Michigan, we are witnessing this young century’s most profound illustration of civic evil, an entire city collectively punished with lead-poisoned water for the crime of being poor, Black, and politically disempowered. Every day, the nation’s homeless, mentally ill, drug addicted, and poor are pushed out of institutions of support and relocated to jails and prisons. These conditions reflect a prevailing belief that the vulnerable are unworthy of investment, protection, or even the most fundamental provisions of the social contract. As a result, they can be erased, abandoned, and even left to die.

Without question, Nobodyness is largely indebted to race, as White supremacy is foundational to the American democratic experiment. The belief that White lives are worth more than others – what Princeton University scholar Eddie Glaude calls the “value gap” – continues to color every aspect of our public and private lives.1 This belief likewise compromises the lives of vulnerable White citizens, many of who support political movements and policies that close ranks around Whiteness rather than ones that enhance their own social and economic interests.

While Nobodyness is strongly tethered to race, it cannot be divorced from other forms of social injustice. Instead, it must be understood through the lens of “intersectionality,” the ways that multiple forms of oppression operate simultaneously against the vulnerable.2 It would be impossible to example the 2014 killing of Mya Hall by National Security Agency police without understanding how sexism and transphobia conspire with structural racism to endanger Black trans bodies. We cannot make sense of Sandra Bland’s tragic death without recognizing the impact of gender and poverty in shaping the current carceral state. To understand the complexity of oppression, we must avoid simple solutions and singular answers.

Despite the centrality of race within American life, Nobodyness cannot be understood without an equally thorough analysis of class. Unlike other forms of difference, class creates the material conditions and relations through which racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression are produced, sustained, and lived. This does not mean that all forms of injustice are due to class antagonism, nor does it mean that all forms of domination can be automatically fixed through universal class struggle. Rather, it means that we cannot begin to address the various forms of oppression experienced by America’s vulnerable without radically changing a system that defends class at all costs.

This book is my attempt to tell these stories of those marked as Nobody. Based on extensive research, as well as my time on the ground – in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York City, Atlanta, Hempstead, Flint, and Sanford – I want to show how the high-profile and controversial cases of State violence that we’ve witnessed over the past few years are but a symptom of a deeper American problem. Underneath each case is a more fundamental set of economic conditions, political arrangements, and power relations that transforms everyday citizens into casualties of an increasingly intense war on the vulnerable. It is my hope that this book offers an analysis that spotlights the humanity of these “Nobodies” and inspires principled action.

#### The world is too complex for local politics---multipolar global politics, economic instability, and climate change necessitates a collective response that changes the structural conditions of power rather than tinkering around at the margins.

Nick SRNICEK AND Alex WILLIAMS 15. \*\*Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics. \*\*Lecturer at City University London. *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*. Verso Books. 34-40.

OVERWHELMED

Why did folk politics arise in the first place? Why is it that folk political tendencies, for all their manifest flaws, are so seductive and appealing to the movements of today? At least three answers present themselves. The first explanation is to see folk politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world. The second, related explanation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experiences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party politics.

Increasingly, multipolar global politics, economic instability, and anthropogenic climate change outpace the narratives we use to structure and make sense of our lives. Each of these is an example of what is termed a complex system, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and which characteristically operates on scales of space and time that go far beyond any individual’s unaided perception.23 Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each of these systems shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them. The global economy is a good example of this. In simple terms, the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘the economy’ in person); it incorporates a wide array of elements, from property laws to biological needs, natural resources to technological infrastructures, market stalls and supercomputers; and it involves an enormous and intricately interacting set of feedback loops, all of which produce emergent effects that are irreducible to its individual components.24 In other words, the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of. While we might have an idea of what an economy consists of, we will never be able to experience it directly in the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically through key statistical indexes (charting changes in inflation or interest rates, stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its totality.

As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most importantly, we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy.25 Recent decades have seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears significantly more complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global finance and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in history and in the world at large.

This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased alienation: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation.26 Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, they nevertheless provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely as a (faulty) cognitive map.

Folk politics presents itself as another possible response to the problems of overwhelming complexity. If we do not understand how the world operates, the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale. Indeed, folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authenticity, to immediacy, to a world that is ‘transparent’, ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, and ‘everyday’.27 Such thinking rejects the complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly postcapitalist world. It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying is the generally asubjective nature of the system. The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same. The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments.

In this process, folk politics often reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, the imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results and the concrete appearance of action. Delaying a corporate attack on the environment, for instance, is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions.28 Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fleeting gestures. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity.

#### The impact is mass death and global violence.

Adrian Parr 13. Associate Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at the University of Cincinnati. *The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*. Columbia University Press. 145-7.

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is.

It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3

The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now.

We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16 09, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5

#### The alt is pragmatic demands upon the state towards an anti-capitalist project. This is necessary to open space for more radical projects. Their strategy cedes the political.

David Harvey 15. Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. “Consolidating Power.” Roar Issue 0, 16. https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power/.

So, looking at examples from southern Europe – solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey – these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach?

I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that the problem with the anarchists is their denial of the significance of power and their inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the refusal to see the state as a possible partner to radical transformation.

There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement – and the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance.

That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized?

To begin with, the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures. How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city – like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization.

There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are therefore terribly important – the center of disease control, for example. How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY [do it yourself]-organization. There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities alone.

One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It was successfully enforced in the 1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics.

From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making.

Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’

So you believe this would require some form of authority?

No, there will be authority structures anyway – there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here – but it’s covert.’

Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation?

At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis of the last years, it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option. I think – and I hate to say this – but I think the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right now.

More pragmatic in what sense?

Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me.

It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very narrow demands open up space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity nonsense and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place.

For example, it would be interesting if Podemos looked towards organizing forms of democratic confederalism – because in some ways Podemos originated with lots of assembly-type meetings taking place all over Spain, so they are very experienced with the assembly structure.

The question is how they connect the assembly-form to some permanent forms of organization concerning their upcoming position as a strong party in Parliament. This also goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because without it the bourgeoisie and corporate capitalism are going to find ways to reassert it and take the power back.

What do you think about the dilemma of solidarity networks filling the void after the retreat of the welfare state and indirectly becoming a partner of neoliberalism in this way?

There are two ways of organizing. One is a vast growth of the NGO sector, but a lot of that is externally funded, not grassroots, and doesn’t tackle the question of the big donors who set the agenda – which won’t be a radical agenda. Here we touch upon the privatization of the welfare state.

This seems to me to be very different politically from grassroots organizations where people are on their own, saying: ‘OK, the state doesn’t take care of anything, so we are going to have to take care of it by ourselves.’ That seems to me to be leading to forms of grassroots organization with a very different political status.

But how to avoid filling that gap by helping, for example, unemployed people not to get squeezed out by neoliberal state?

Well there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, so that when the group works with people everybody knows that it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent to politically change the system in its entirety. This means having a very clear political project, which is problematic with decentralized, non-homogenous types of movements where somebody works one way, others work differently and there is no collective or common project.

This connects to the very first question you raised: there is no coordination of what the political objectives are. And the danger is that you just help people cope and there will be no politics coming out of it. For example, Occupy Sandy helped people get back to their houses and they did terrific work, but in the end they did what the Red Cross and federal emergency services should have done.

The end of history seems to have passed already. Looking at the actual conditions and concrete examples of anti-capitalist struggle, do you think “winning” is still an option?

Definitely, and moreover, you have occupied factories in Greece, solidarity economies across production chains being forged, radical democratic institutions in Spain and many beautiful things happening in many other places. There is a healthy growth of recognition that we need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives.

The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive of some of this stuff and I think they are wrong. But at the same time I don’t think that any of this is big enough on its own to actually deal with the fundamental structures of power that need to be challenged. Here we talk about nothing less than a state. So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus.

#### Extinction outweighs.

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### Solvency---1NC

#### Neg on presumption---ballot on Tabroom doesn’t solve their criticism of how debaters and coaches understand arguments, let alone academic fields external to the activity when their method is refusal.

#### Legal avenues are key to build up social movements that challenge power.

Kate Andrias and Benjamin I. Sachs 21, Kate Andrias is Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Benjamin I. Sachs is Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and Industry, Harvard Law School, “Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality,” 130 Yale L.J. 546, January 2021, lexis.

[\*548] INTRODUCTION

Among the painful truths made evident by COVID-19 are the deep inequality of American society and the profound inadequacy of our social-welfare infrastructure. The nation's lack of comprehensive health care, 1Link to the text of the noteits underfunded and inefficient system of unemployment insurance, 2Link to the text of the noteand weak workplace safety and health guarantees, 3Link to the text of the notealong with nearly nonexistent paid sick leave, 4Link to the text of the notedebtor-forgiveness rules, 5Link to the text of the noteand tenant protections 6Link to the text of the noteleave poor and working-class communities--particularly communities of color--dangerously exposed to the ravages of this pandemic, both physical and economic. 7Link to the text of the noteAmerica's weak social safety net is, in turn, a product of a profound failure that has plagued American democracy for decades now: the wealthy exercising vastly disproportionate power over politics and government. 8Link to the text of the note

[\*549] Indeed, public faith in American democracy is at near-record lows, and increasing numbers of Americans report that they no longer feel confident in the health of their democratic institutions. When asked why, many say that money has too much of an influence on politics and that politicians are unresponsive to the concerns of regular Americans. 9Link to the text of the noteResearch supports these fears, showing both that wealthy individuals are spending record sums on electoral politics 10Link to the text of the noteand that elected officials are at best only weakly accountable to nonwealthy constituents. 11Link to the text of the note [\*550] As political scientist Martin Gilens has observed, "[W]hen preferences between the well-off and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor." 12Link to the text of the note

Of course, democracy does not require that policymaking always follow majority will or the median voter's preferences. But democracy, as well as the faith citizens have in their government, falters when lawmakers persistently disregard the priorities of nonwealthy citizens.

Much of the legal scholarship (and public commentary) concerned with this democracy deficit focuses on the increased flow of money into electoral politics and advocates for stemming that flow. 13Link to the text of the noteScholars writing in this vein criticize the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, exemplified by Citizens United v. FEC, that has enabled unfettered campaign spending. 14Link to the text of the noteThey offer a range of reforms designed to limit the flow of money into elections, many of which would require a change in the composition of the Supreme Court or the ratification of a constitutional amendment. 15Link to the text of the noteA related group of scholars advocates for shielding the legislative and administrative process from money's influence through, for example, lobbying restrictions and disclosure requirements. 16Link to the text of the note

[\*551] A second robust body of scholarship focuses not on insulating the political process from money but on trying to ensure equal rights of individuals to participate in the governance process through elections. These scholars criticize barriers to equal voting rights, including contemporary uses of gerrymandering and legislation that impose hurdles on individual voters' ability to exercise the franchise or minimize the effective voting power of particular constituents. 17Link to the text of the noteScholars urge both doctrinal and legislative reform that would ensure more equal rights of participation.

In the last few years, a third approach has begun to emerge in the legal scholarship. This approach begins by recognizing the difficulty--both practical and constitutional--of keeping money out of politics. It also recognizes that while equal voting and participation rights are critical to the goal of combatting political inequality, they are not enough to ensure political equality in a system where wealth functions so prominently as an independent source of political influence. Thus, this third approach moves beyond campaign finance and individual participation rights and focuses instead on what we will call countervailing power. In particular, this approach is concerned with the ability of mass-membership organizations to equalize the political voice of citizens who lack the political influence that comes from wealth. 18Link to the text of the note

The beneficial effects of countervailing, mass-membership organizations are well known to theorists and researchers of democracy. 19Link to the text of the notePut simply, such groups increase political equality by building and consolidating political power for the [\*552] nonwealthy, thus serving as counterweights to the political influence of the rich. Mass-membership organizations can serve in this capacity because, at bottom, they aggregate the political resources and political power of people who, acting as individuals, are disempowered relative to wealthy individuals and institutions. 20Link to the text of the noteMore particularly, mass-membership organizations enable pooling of politically relevant resources, including money, among individuals with fewsuch resources; they provide information to decisionmakers about ordinary citizens' views; they navigate opaque and fragmented government structures, thereby enabling citizens to monitor government behavior; and they allow citizens to hold decisionmakers accountable. And, in fact, when citizens are organized into mass-membership associations that are active in the political sphere, researchers find an exception to the general rule that policymakers are disproportionally responsive to the preferences and concerns of the wealthy. 21Link to the text of the note

Over recent decades, however, there has been a decline in broad-based, massmembership organizations of low- and middle-income Americans. 22Link to the text of the noteThis decline in countervailing organizations has exacerbated the political distortions caused by the increase in political spending by the wealthy. But the capacity for countervailing organizations to address the distorting effects of wealth raises a critical question for legal scholars: How can law facilitate the construction of countervailing organizations among the nonwealthy? Put differently, how can law facilitate political organizing among Americans whose voices are drowned out by the distorting effects of wealth? That is the question we address in this Article.

Recently, legal scholars have begun to address related topics. For example, K. Sabeel Rahman and Miriam Seifter have written about ways that participation in administrative processes can improve the organizational strength of citizen groups. Thus, Rahman argues for designing administrative processes in ways that enhance the countervailing power of ordinary citizens, 23Link to the text of the notewhile Seifter urges administrative-law scholars to pay attention to the characteristics of interest groups participating in the administrative process and to consider "looking [\*553] within interest groups," referencing the manner by which interest groups determine the views of their constituents, "to illuminate the quality and nature of participation in administrative governance." 24Link to the text of the noteTabatha Abu El-Haj has urged greater use of universal benefits and targeted philanthropy, to encourage the growth of mass-membership organizations, since both "create reasons to organize on the part of beneficiaries." 25Link to the text of the noteBoth of us have written about the countervailing role that labor organizations can play in politics. 26Link to the text of the noteAnd Daryl Levinson and one of us have written about the ways in which ordinary public policy often has the effect--and at times the intent--of mobilizing political organization around the policy. 27Link to the text of the note

Meanwhile, another group of legal scholars has highlighted the importance of social movements and their organizations in legal change, focusing on how movements shape decisionmaking by courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. 28Link to the text of the noteIn particular, a rich literature has developed on the relationship between popular mobilization and evolving constitutional principles, 29Link to the text of the noteand on [\*554] how "cause lawyers" can best serve social movements. 30Link to the text of the noteMore recently, there has been a resurgence of scholarship that "cogenerates legal meaning alongside left social movements, their organizing, and their visions." 31Link to the text of the noteThis work builds on an older tradition of critical legal studies and critical race theory that interrogates the limits of traditional legal rights in bringing about progressive social change given the political, economic, and social conditions that systematically disadvantage poor people and people of color. 32Link to the text of the note

To date, however, no one has tackled directly the question that we pose here. 33Link to the text of the noteRather than asking how the enactment of substantive legislation or administrative-participation mechanisms might boost organizing, how social [\*555] movements can or hope to reshape law, or how a focus on traditional legal rights disables fundamental social change, we ask how law could be used explicitly and directly to enable low- and middle-income Americans to build their own socialmovement organizations for political power.

The question is particularly urgent today as the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated society's existing inequalities. Working-class communities, especially low- and middle-income people of color, have experienced hardships as a result of the disease to a far greater extent than the wealthy--from massive unemployment to dangerous working conditions, from food insecurity to rising debt and risk of eviction. 34Link to the text of the noteThe suffering wrought by the pandemic, as well as by the financial crisis of 2008, has led to an upsurge in protests by low- and middle-income Americans, particularly among workers, tenants, and debtors. 35Link to the text of the noteAt the same time, endemic violence against Black communities, including the recent killing of George Floyd, has led to widespread organizing around issues of racial justice. 36Link to the text of the noteThese movements demand that government respond to the [\*556] concerns of ordinary Americans and attempt to elicit better treatment from powerful actors. Yet, despite their promise, such movements face significant obstacles in translating their members' anger into robust and lasting political power. 37Link to the text of the noteA pressing task, therefore, is to ask how law can facilitate and protect these new and revived protest movements, helping to create durable organizations that can exercise sustained power in the political economy.

We start from the premise that the robustness of countervailing, mass-membership organizations should be understood as a problem both of and for law. The shape of civil society and organizational life is already a product of legal structures and rules. 38Link to the text of the noteAnd although law has frequently been a tool of oppression, rather than of empowerment, of poor and working-class people and movements, 39Link to the text of the notealternative legal regimes that encourage the growth of and the exercise of power by social-movement organizations of the poor and working class are possible. Indeed, for those who are committed to decreasing political inequality, alternative legal structures that encourage the growth of countervailing organizations are imperative.

In analyzing how legal and institutional reforms could facilitate a different picture of organizational and political life in the United States, we draw from the successes and failures of labor law--the area of U.S. law that most explicitly and directly creates a right to collective organization for working people--while also moving beyond that context to literature considering "how, in what forms, and under what conditions social movements become a force for social and political change." 40Link to the text of the noteWe do not attempt to adjudicate priority among factors that [\*557] contribute to successful organizing, nor do we attempt to build an exhaustive list of such factors. Instead, we consolidate factors that have two attributes: (1) they are likely to contribute to the successful building of membership organizations among poor and working-class people, and (2) their existence or development might be enabled by law.

We recognize that some factors, undoubtedly critical to successful organizing, are beyond the reach of our proposal. For example, sociologists and historians have demonstrated that several structural opportunities helped facilitate the growth of the Civil Rights movement, including the collapse of cotton; the increase in Black migration and electoral strength; and the advent of World War II and the Cold War. 41Link to the text of the noteThese kinds of objective structural conditions, exogenous to movements themselves, are frequently important to movement formation, but they cannot be directly affected by the kinds of legal reforms we suggest. Likewise, sociologists have shown that strategic leadership within organizations is critical to movement success, 42Link to the text of the notebut internal leadership dynamics are not easily affected through legal regulation. 43Link to the text of the note

Three additional principles guide our analysis. First, because small-scale, concrete victories are essential to successful organizing, and because organizing tends to be most successful among people with shared identities and existing relationships, we focus on reforms that enable organizing within particular structures of authority and resource relations. By way of examples, we consider organizing among workers, tenants, debtors, and recipients of public benefits. We pick these contexts in part because they are ones rife with exploitation and [\*558] power imbalances and populated by the relevant income groups, and in part because they are home to important organizing efforts, both historical and contemporary. 44Link to the text of the noteWe do not suggest that these are the only relevant contexts in which our suggestions might be explored, nor do we in any sense imply that broader organizational development encompassing poor and working-class people as a whole is impossible or ineffective. In fact, the context-specific organizing regimes we envision might well facilitate broader community-based and political organization. However, we leave for another day exploration of how the law might directly enable broad-based political organization--say, a political organization of all poor people or a political-party system that incentivizes grassroots participation among nonwealthy individuals. 45Link to the text of the note

Second, we focus on how law can build organization, as opposed to more amorphous configurations of insurgency. The organizations our reforms seek to facilitate are very much social-movement actors, in that they seek to change "elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society." 46Link to the text of the noteBut the goal is to encourage enduring organization that can wield sustained, [\*559] countervailing power. 47Link to the text of the noteThus, our approach rejects the idea that formal structures facilitated by law are necessarily deradicalizing and inimical to social change. 48Link to the text of the note

Finally, our focus is on how law can facilitate organizations of working-class and poor Americans--not on either of two other questions: one, how law could be designed specifically to enhance the political power of communities of color, or two, how law could encourage the formation of interest groups generally. The first question could not be more critical. Just as our government is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, it is also disproportionately responsive to white people, 49Link to the text of the noteand the crisis of structural racism is perhaps the most acute we face as a nation. As such, a program for building political power among communities of color is just as necessary as a program for building power among workers and the poor. But it is also true that our focus on working and poor Americans ought, in practice, and in part due to the crisis of structural racism itself, to amount to a program for building power among and by communities of color. This is not the exclusive reach of our proposals, and continued attention must be paid to ensure that racial inequities do not infect the political organizing we aspire to enable. But because people of color are over-represented in the sectors of the population that we do address--low-income workers, tenants, government-benefits recipients, debtors--these communities would likely benefit from the success of our proposals. As to the second question, while a more expansive civil society may bring a host of benefits, including greater social cohesion and civic education, this Article's concern is with building organizations that can serve as a countervailing force to the extraordinary power of economic elites in our political economy. 50Link to the text of the note

[\*560] We argue that a legal regime designed to enable this kind of organizing should have several components. First, the law should grant collective rights in an explicit and direct way so as to create a "frame" that encourages organizing. Second, as importantly, though more prosaically, the law should provide for a reliable, administrable, and sustainable source of financial, informational, human, and other relevant resources. Third, the law should guarantee free spaces--both physical and digital--in which movement organization can occur, free from surveillance or control. Fourth, the law should remove barriers to participation, both by protecting all those involved from retaliation--no worker may be fired, no tenant evicted, no debtor penalized, and no welfare recipient deprived of benefits because they are active in or supportive of the movement's efforts--and by removing material obstacles that make it difficult for poor and working people to organize. Fifth, the law should provide the organizations with ways to make material change in their members' lives and should create mechanisms for the exercise of real political and economic power, for example by providing the right to "bargain" with the relevant set of private actors and by facilitating organizational participation in governmental processes. Finally, the law should enable contestation and disruption, offering protections for the right to protest and strike. 51Link to the text of the note

The particulars necessarily vary by context. For example, a law designed to generate organizing among tenants would start by affirmatively granting tenants the right to form and join tenant unions. It would grant such unions the right to access information and landlord property for organizational purposes. It would vest the organization with authority to collect dues payments through deductions from rent payments. It would mandate that landlords negotiate with tenants' organizations over rent and housing conditions. It would ensure that organizations have special rights of participation in administrative processes related to housing policy. And it would provide for the right of tenants to engage in rent strikes and protests, free from retaliation. A law designed to facilitate organizing among debtors would similarly create a collective frame, provide a mechanism for funding, protect against retaliation, mandate bargaining and [\*561] rights of participation in governance, and protect the right to protest and strike, but a debtor-organizing law might not provide for access to physical spaces, instead putting more emphasis on providing information and enabling online organizing.

Some of our proposals will generate resistance--theoretical, legal, and political. And, indeed, we concede that our approach has limitations. For example, we do not attempt to articulate the optimal level of political influence that the organizations in question ought to enjoy, nor a way of measuring when and whether they have become sufficiently strong. As Richard Pildes has written in a related context, we believe it is possible to "identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong without a precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or right." 52Link to the text of the noteIn addition, the scope of our inquiry is limited to problems of economic inequality. Yet we do not mean in any way to minimize other aspects of inequality, including racial and gender discrimination and hierarchy, which are both inseparable from economic inequality and worthy of separate examination and intervention. To that end, we believe law ought to require inclusion and nondiscrimination among poor and working people's social-movement organizations. 53Link to the text of the note

Finally, we recognize both that our recommendations will not provide a panacea to the imbalance in power that characterizes our political economy and that our proposals will be difficult to enact. Indeed, although we suggest a range of possible reforms and explain how they could be achieved, the goal is to illuminate law's constitutive potential and to suggest a path for further work, not to provide a comprehensive blueprint. 54Link to the text of the noteIn short, analysis of what makes poor and working people's social-movement organizations succeed helps show that law [\*562] can make a difference--and that the absence of such law is a choice, one we believe our society cannot afford to make. 55Link to the text of the note

#### Working within legal and political structures is especially key to solve their impacts.

**Rifkin 17,** Mark Rifkin is Director of the Women's and Gender Studies Program and Professor of English at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro and the author of several books, including Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance. ["Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the “Peculiar” Status of Native Peoples," Sovereign Acts: Contesting Colonialism Across Indigenous Nations and Latinx America, University of Arizona Press, 2017, pgs. 296-335.]//ARK1

As against Alfred’s call for eschewing the framework of “sovereignty,” Dale Turner insists that the **protection of Native peoples involves** making their **concerns** and **representations intelligible within** the **legal and political structures of the settler state**. In This Is Not a Peace Pipe, Turner argues that the **political terrain on which Native** peoples **must move** has been **mapped by the settler state** and that **if they are to gain greater traction** for their land claims and assertions of governmental autonomy, they will need to **express them** in ways **that non-Native** people and **institutions can understand**: “As a matter of survival, **Aboriginal intellectuals must engage** the **non-Aboriginal intellectual landscapes from which** their **political rights and sovereignty** are **articulated** and put to use in Aboriginal communities.”66 Given that non-Native political processes already are active in shaping the terms of Indigenous governance and social life, **Native** peoples cannot **afford simply to ignore them or** to insist on the significance of “traditional” knowledge in ways that **speak past non-Native modes of articulation**. Turner suggests that such translation is the work of “the word warrior,” whose “most difficult task will be to **reconcile indigenous ways of knowing with** the **forms of knowledge that define European intellectual traditions**.”67 “Survival” for Native polities, from this perspective, is predicated on a kind of communication in which discrepant “ways of knowing” can be bridged. However, to what extent does Turner’s notion of “**reconcil[ing]” knowledges** also present the struggle over sovereignty as a function of cultural dissonance **between Indigenous peoples and the settler state**? The central question he poses is, “How do we explain our differences and in the process **empower ourselves to actually change** the **state’s legal and political practices**?”68 But does **transposing Indigenous concepts into non-Native terminologies intervene** in the logic structuring “the state’s legal and political practices”? Does such a conversion challenge the jurisdictional imperative and imaginary driving the settler-state assertion of authority over Native peoples?

The idea of “explain[ing]” Indigenous “differences” acknowledges the imperial force exerted under the sign of sovereignty, but it does not contest the state’s monopoly over the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, nor does it prevent those “differences” from being reified, regulated, and subordinated as “culture” in the ways discussed earlier. Alongside the discussion of the necessity for translation by “word warriors,” Turner also calls for a thorough accounting of the violences of settler-state imperialism: “The project of unpacking and laying bare the meaning and effects of colonialism will open up the physical and **intellectual space for Aboriginal voice to participate** in the **legal** and **political practices of the state**.”69 Later, he suggests that **Indigenous intellectuals should** pursue three goals: “(a) they must take up, **deconstruct**, and continue to **resist colonialism** and its effects on indigenous peoples; (b) they must protect and defend indigeneity; **and** (c) they must **engage the legal and political discourses of the state** in an effective way.”70 What kind of “participat[ion]” and “engage[ment]” do such strategies yield?

Although Turner tends to answer this question by focusing on the possibility of explaining Indigenous intellectual traditions, making them comprehensible to non-Natives, the above comments offer another option, namely, deconstructing the dynamics of settler-state power—problematizing the ways it seeks to generate legitimacy for itself. He describes such intervention as “understanding . . . how colonialism has been woven into the normative political language that guides contemporary Canadian legal and political practices,” and folding deconstruction back into the elaboration of “differences” between Natives and non-Natives, he argues, “**indigenous peoples must use** the **normative language of the dominant culture to** ultimately **defend world views** that are **embedded in completely different normative frameworks**.

### AT: King

#### King’s refusal is anti-Indigenous. Despite being interdisciplinary, King et al prioritize an Afropessimist reading of sovereignty and Black-Native relations. This justifies elimination on a scholarly and material level.

Johnson 21 (KHALIL ANTHONY JOHNSON JR. is assistant professor of African American studies at Wesleyan University. Fall 2021, Book Review: Otherwise Worlds: Against Settler Colonialism and Anti-Blackness ed. by Tiffany Lethabo King, Jenell Navarro and Andrea Smith, Native American and Indigenous Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, Fall 2021, University of Minnesota Press, JKS)

OTHERWISE WORLDS IS THE FIRST major anthology on Black and Indigenous relations to appear since Patrick Wolfe's article "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native" (Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 [2006]) and Frank B. Wilderson III's Afro-pessimist monograph, Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (2010). Whereas ethnic studies originated from revolutionary Third World movements for global liberation, the institutionalization of Black studies and Native studies resulted in a "tendency to position one's field, ontological position, politics, and modes of knowledge production as incommensurable" (9). Otherwise Worlds avoids such origins. Refusing the "baggage" of genealogy, the coeditors, Tiffany Lethabo King, Jenell Navarro, and Andrea Smith, instead ask contributors to speak as "amateurs" across the disciplinary divide (11, 6). Twenty chapters are divided across four thematic sections. The editors ask, "How do we carefully tend to relationships between Native and Black communities that lead toward liberation?" (13). Meandering readers will find earnest responses. For Ashon Crawley, love and care vibrate in ways that exceed settler violence. Sandra Harvey unearths Black Choctaw testimony from the Dawes enrollment archive that "rejects historical narratives of natal alienation and puts forth the possibility of 'African' political and social determination, including particular relationships to land" (227). Rinaldo Walcott pushes beyond the nation-state and Western thought to consider the indigenization of Black people in the Americas as a political process that might foster a "pure decolonial project" (356). Marcus Briggs-Cloud beautifully demonstrates how ancient Muskogee epistemology renders anti-Blackness literally unthinkable. Reading the book sequentially offers a different experience. The first Indigenous contributor appears on page 213. And even as its introduction calls beyond Black and Native incommensurability—a notion popularized in Jared Sexton's "The Vel of Slavery," which the anthology reprints—the opening paragraphs position the book squarely within Afro-pessimistic terrain and reduce the complex histories of Black and Native peoples in the Americas into a binary "relationship between Native genocide and anti-Blackness" (1). Otherwise Worlds contains no sustained consideration of anti-Indigeneity. There is no acknowledgment that Black people may operate in oppressive roles within U.S. settler colonialism vis-à-vis Native peoples, and there is no engagement with the histories of Liberia or Sierra Leone, where Black settlers from the U.S. and U.K. conquered, enslaved, and "civilized" West African tribes. Neither is there any apparent comprehension that the enslavement of Indigenous people persisted in New Mexico long after the Thirteenth Amendment or that slavery was a central means toward Indian genocide in California. Instead, its most consistent themes argue against Indigenous sovereignty and the contributions of settler-colonial studies. A conversation between Wilderson and King concludes the first section and sets the tone for several chapters. Wilderson states, without evidence, that "anti-Blackness is driving the quest for [Indigenous] sovereignty as much as the desire to get rid of the settler" (55). Such pessimism informs King's subsequent chapter, which argues that conquest should displace Marxist-humanist-inflected "white settler colonial studies" (79). Her citations of Native scholars, narrowly mediated through Wilderson and Smith, facilitate her claim that settler-colonial studies performs a "discursive genocide" that erases "Native scholars, texts, and analytics"—an assertion that, ironically, enacts what it denounces (82). Sexton curates a few essays on Black-Native solidarity to argue that Indigenous sovereignty is inherently anti-Black and should be abolished. "This point," he insists, "is not mitigated by the fact that Native sovereignty is qualitatively different from, and not simply a rival to, the sovereignty of nation-states" (107). Smith's argument that federally-recognized sovereignty is "deferred genocide" only approaches coherence if one decouples Indigenous sovereignty from Indigenous epistemologies and presumes—following Wilderson and Sexton—that both have been subsumed under the prerogatives of Western conquest. Cedric Sunray's forty-page polemic weaponizes anti-Blackness in tribal enrollment and federal recognition against so-called "nouveau ideas of sovereignty" (240), undermining the Cherokee Nation's power to determine its citizenry. Surely some NAIS readers will wonder what motivates this antagonism. These arguments against Indigenous sovereignty overwhelm contingencies. So when the fourth section opens with a paean to Beyoncé as an Indigenous feminist icon, it comes across as terrifyingly superficial. It is unfortunate that Otherwise Worlds presents Afro-pessimism as the forefront of Black radical thought because there is almost nothing at stake in an Afro-pessimist argument that has nihilistically ceded political liberation to an apocalypse. But there is so much at stake for Indigenous nations as sovereign political entities in the struggle against ongoing elimination. It is troublesome that this book, which runs counter to the histories, theoretical interventions, and political philosophies within Native American and Indigenous studies, may otherwise introduce many to the field. [End Page 157]

### Turn---1NC

#### Their description of debate as a monopoly per CX turns the case. It reinforces corporatization of education and normalizes inequitable power structures.

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

### Lightfoot---1NC

#### Their structural reading relies on pessimistic traps that are diametrically opposed to Indigenous agency and efforts to reassert nationhood both here and abroad.

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Sheryl, “The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence,” Chapter 10 in *Pessimism in International Relations*, Eds. Stevens, T., & Michelsen, N., Palgrave)

Imagining a Post-Colonial Future: Pessimistic ‘Resurgence’ Versus the Optimism and Tenacity of Indigenous Movements on the Ground

All of these writers advocate Indigenous resurgence, through a combination of rejecting the current reconciliation politics of settler colonial states, coupled with a return to land-based Indigenous expressions of governance as the only viable, ‘authentic’ and legitimate path to a better future for Indigenous peoples, which they refer to as decolonisation. While inherently critical in their orientation, these three approaches do make some positive and productive contributions to Indigenous movements. They help shed light on the various and subtle ways that Indigenous leaders and communities can become co-opted into a colonial system. They help us to hold leadership accountable. They also help us keep a strong focus on our traditional, cultural and spiritual values as well as our traditional forms of governance which then also helps us imagine future possibilities.

As I have pointed out here, however, all three theorists are also caught in the same three pessimism traps: authenticity versus co-option; a vision of the state as unified, deliberate and never changing in its desire to colonise and control; and a view of engagement with the state as futile, if not dangerous, to Indigenous sovereignty and existence. When combined, these three pessimism traps aim to inhibit Indigenous peoples’ engagement with the state in any process that could potentially re-imagine and re-formulate their current relationship into one that could be transformative and post-colonial, as envisioned by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The pessimism traps together work to foreclose any possibility that there could be credible openings of opportunity to negotiate a fairer and just relationship of co-existence with even the most progressive state government.

This pessimistic approach is not innocuous. By overemphasising structure and granting the state an enormous degree of agency as a unitary actor, this pessimistic approach does a remarkable disservice to Indigenous resistance movements by proscribing, from academia, an extremely narrow view of what Indigenous self-determination can and should mean in practice. By overlooking and/or discounting Indigenous agency and not even considering the possibility that Indigenous peoples could themselves be calculating, strategic political actors in their own right, and vis-à-vis states, the pessimistic lens of the resurgence school unnecessarily, unproductively and unjustly limits the feld of possibility for Indigenous peoples’ decision-making, thus actually countering and inhibiting expressions of Indigenous self-determination. By condemning—writ large—all Indigenous peoples and organisations that wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the state, negotiate mutually benefcial agreements with the state, and/or who have advocated on the international level for a set of standards that can provide a positive guiding framework for Indigenous-state relations, the pessimistic lens of resurgence forecloses much potential for new and improved relations, in any form, and is very likely to lead to deeper conficts between states and Indigenous peoples, and potentially, even violent action, which Fanon indicated was the necessary outcome. The pessimism traps of the resurgence school are therefore, likely self-defeating for all but the most remote and isolated Indigenous communities. Further, this approach is quite out of step with the actions and vision of many Indigenous resistance movements on the ground who have been working for decades to advance Indigenous self-determination, both domestically and globally, in ways that transform the colonial state into something more just and may eventually present creative alternatives to the Westphalian state form in ways that could respect and accommodate Indigenous nations. Rather, it aims to shame and blame those who wish to explore creative and innovative post-colonial resolutions to the colonial condition.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration or UN Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 after 25 years of development. The Declaration is ground-breaking, given the key leadership roles Indigenous peoples played in negotiating and achieving this agreement.45 Additionally, for the frst time in UN history, the rights holders, Indigenous peoples, worked with states to develop an instrument that would serve to promote, protect and affirm Indigenous rights, both globally and in individual domestic contexts.46

Many Indigenous organisations and movements, from dozens of countries around the world, were involved in drafting and negotiating the UN Declaration and are now advocating for its full implementation, both internationally and in domestic and regional contexts. In Canada, some of the key organisational players—the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), the Assembly of First Nations, and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, or their predecessor organisations—were involved in the drafting and lengthy negotiations of the UN Declaration during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the United States, organisations like the American Indian Law Alliance and the Native American Rights Fund have been involved as well as the Navajo Nation and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, who represent themselves as Indigenous peoples’ governing institutions. From Scandinavia, the Saami Council and the Sami Parliaments all play a key role in advancing Indigenous rights. In Latin America, organisations like the Confederación de Nationalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA) advocate for implementation of the UN Declaration. The three, major transnational Indigenous organisations— the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the International Indian Treaty Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council—were all key members of the drafting and negotiating team for the UN Declaration, and the latter two, which are still in existence, continue their strong advocacy for its full implementation.

Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires fundamental and significant change, on both the international and domestic levels. Because implementation of Indigenous rights essentially calls for a complete and fundamental restructuring of Indigenous-state relationships, it expects states to enact and implement a significant body of legal, constitutional, legislative and policy changes that can accommodate such things as Indigenous land rights, free, prior and informed consent, redress and a variety of self-government, autonomy and other such arrangements. States are not going to implement this multifaceted and complex set of changes on their own, however. They will require significant political and moral pressure to hold them accountable to the rhetorical commitments they have made to support this level of change. They will also require ongoing conversation and negotiation with Indigenous peoples along the way, lest the process becomes problematically one-sided. Such processes ultimately require sustained political will, commitment and engagement over the long term, to reach the end result of radical systemic change and Indigenous state relationships grounded in mutual respect, co-existence and reciprocity. This type of fundamental change requires creative thinking, careful diplomacy, tenacity, and above all, optimistic vision, on the part of Indigenous peoples. The pessimistic approaches of the resurgence school are ultimately of little use in these efforts, other than as a cautionary tale against state power, of which the organisational players are already keenly aware. Further, by dismissing and discouraging all efforts at engagement with states, and especially with the blanket accusations that all who engage in such efforts are ‘co-opted’ and not ‘authentically’ Indigenous, the resurgence school actually creates unnecessary negative feelings and divisions amongst Indigenous movements who should be pooling limited resources and working together towards better futures.

### AT: Refusal---1NC

#### Refusal must be open to iterative refinement which can only be achieved through debating the stasis point of the resolution.

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Alex Zahara, “Ethnographic Refusal: A How to Guide,” Discard Studies, August 8, 2016, <https://discardstudies.com/2016/08/08/ethnographic-refusal-a-how-to-guide/>

Activist researchers have the potential to uncover particularly sensitive information that, when revealed, may have very real social and material consequences for research participants and their communities. Examples of this could include the presence of contamination (in places, bodies or animals), access to knowledge that is considered sacred, or interview responses that are political and potentially identifying. Additionally, we might be given access to potentially painful community events and experiences. As researchers interested in social justice, how do we proceed helpfully and ethically in our research in such situations?

The concept of refusal is one way forward. Refusal is a method whereby researchers and research participants together decide not to make particular information available for use within the academy. It is intended to redirect academic analysis away from harmful pain-based narratives that obscure slow violence and towards the structures, institutions, and practices that engender those narratives. Doing so provides research participants the opportunity to (1) dictate whether knowledge is to be made available within the academy (or elsewhere); and (2) to determine how issues are responded to, when, and by whom. While anthropologists initially dismissed the concept of refusal for producing ‘incomplete’ depictions of marginalized groups (Ortner 1995), Indigenous theorists have reframed refusal as a decolonizing research method (Simpson 2007; Tuck and Yang 2014). According to Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s Decolonizing Methodologies (2012), decolonization requires attending to “…the implications of research for its participants and their communities” (p.19). For her and other Indigenous researchers, doing so necessitates community collaboration and control over research projects (Zavala 2013). Accordingly, the method is centrally concerned with a community’s right to self-representation, regardless of the community under study.

Action

In this section, the term ‘refusal’ is used in two ways: first, to describe the action of when a research participant refuses to engage in a particular topic of conversation or suggests to a researcher that something should not be published; and second, when a researcher—based on their own understanding of a given situation, or in response to research participants—refuses to publish this information. Here are some strategies for identifying and collaborating with research refusals.

Identifying what to refuse:

Preparation: Prior to conducting fieldwork, researchers should do ‘homework’ (Sundberg 2015), making an effort to understand the politics of the information that they’re gathering and producing. In doing so, contextualize your data within ongoing contestations, historical injustices, or hegemonic power relations. In many instances, this might best be done by conducting research in communities that we belong to or are otherwise already accountable to (Moffitt et al. 2015). Determine whether community members are already addressing issues on their own terms (e.g. Simpson 2007). If so, make contact and assess whether research is helpful.

Listen and reflect: When conducting interviews, identify not just overt refusals, but points of hesitation (Cameron 2015), changes in subject (Tuck & Yang 2014b), or semi/untruthful interview responses (Simpson 2007). These may be participant refusals, and should be contextualized or addressed accordingly.

Collaboration: If you’re not a member of the community you are researching with, research partnerships are necessary for confirming whether or not the information you have access to should be made available elsewhere. Participatory Action Research methods ensure involvement in this process (Zavala 2013). Alternatively, researchers might seek advice from specific community members for whom they have already developed a trustworthy relationship (Cameron 2015; Keene 2016). Researchers might also engage in community peer review, presenting research to community members prior to publishing information elsewhere (or refusing to do so).

How to refuse:

Studying up: Rather than studying the suffering of marginalized groups, researchers should focus instead on the systems and people responsible for this suffering (e.g. corporations, governments, or others in positions of power). This particular method is referred to as ‘studying up’. For an overview as it relates to refusal, see Gaztambide-Fernandez (2015).

Knowledge production: Researchers are recommended to ‘engage generatively’ with refusals (Simpson 2007). Doing so involves interpreting refusals— without revealing their content— by analyzing them within their historical or cultural context. See, for example, Dr. Adrienne Keene’s (2016) excellent discussion (and refusal to discuss) Navajo understandings and spiritual practices, and how they have been misrepresented in popular culture (specifically by author J.K. Rowling on the ‘Pottermore’ website).

Image use: Academics using photographs or producing visual outputs should select or digitally alter images (Gonzales-Day 2016) to “shift[] the gaze from the violated body to the violating instruments.” (Tuck and Yang 2014: 241). In doing so, the image itself produces a refusal. See also the images of e-waste centre Agbogbloshie taken by Alhassan Ibn Abdalla and featured in this post, or the example in Image 1 (below).

Ethical Considerations

While researchers may not be required to include refusals in their institutional ethics clearance (since it is an action of not reporting information), there are a number of other ethical considerations that researchers might face. First, because the method is centrally concerned with community representation, refusal necessarily involves aligning with particular individuals or stakeholders. Doing so may result in tensions— with other research participants, partners, or academics— regarding whether or how something should be refused. In turn, researchers should engage in reflexivity (Rose 1997) or ongoing project evaluation (Mathison 2014) in order to ensure they are proceeding forward on the basis of one’s positioning, research goals and ethics (e.g. community self-determination). Second, a researcher has the authority to decide what information is to be refused or how this information is interpreted, resulting in power imbalances between researcher and research participants and creating opportunities for community misrepresentation. In turn, community and participant peer review is necessary to ensure

community and participant peer review is necessary to ensure

### Turn---1NC

#### The aff disavows humanism---it should instead be strategically reappropriated, only that can solve a litany of existential threats.

Isaac KAMOLA 17, an Assistant Professor of political science at Trinity College [“A time for anticolonial theory,” *Contemporary Political Theory*, First Online: October 5, 2017, p. 1-8, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41296-017-0161-8]

Today the world seems profoundly broken. Decades of endemic financial crisis and stagnant real wages have produced planetary inequality of such magnitude that eight white men now own the same wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population (Oxfam, 2017). Seemingly nihilistic armed conflicts e

ngulf many regions of world, contributing to a reality in which one in every hundred people on the planet lives as a refugee (Connor and Krogstad, 2016). It is now ninety-five percent likely that temperatures will rise above the two-degree Celsius threshold, making the most dangerous effects of global climate change largely inevitable (Raftery et al., 2017). And this does not even include the success of racist, alt-right, and fascist movements across the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. All this at a time when governments and institutions around the world seem completely ill-equipped to even begin engaging the issues central to human survival.

This brave new world is not only profoundly dispiriting, it poses very serious challenges to those whose academic and political practice involves critically engaging the world with the aim of crafting the theoretical tools – or, as Amílcar Cabral (1979) might suggest, weapons – needed to change it. Today, the academic workbench of concepts, theories, and analysis seems woefully inadequate to honestly stare into the abyss before us, much less provide meaningful guidance for systemic transformation. One reason for the considerable gulf between available theories and present political realities stems from the fact that much of the intellectual tradition structuring the academy today was built alongside imperial or liberal political and historical trajectories. Many of the cherished thinkers we draw upon to construct the contemporary political imaginaries were often coconspirators in the solidification of the European state system and Western imperialism. During the twentieth century, theorists engaged in celebrating a politics of mass demonstration and deliberation, social movements, democratization, and post-Cold War cosmopolitan civil society. The theoretical lessons learned from these historical moments now seem either complicit in, or overly stressed by, the weight of the current pressures. Similarly, many of the political and theoretical apparatuses used to critique this history pale in the face of a historical moment that seems to demand a renewed militancy of purpose, a willingness to take risks for justice, and the urgent need for even more vibrant and vital networks of human solidarity.

It is not surprising, therefore, that within the current conjuncture political thinkers in the Western academy have begun returning to the shelves of the African anticolonial archive (for example: el-Malik and Kamola, 2017; Phạm and Shilliam, 2016; el-Malik, 2016). The twentieth-century struggles against colonialism in Africa, the African diaspora, and around the world, seem to once again speak in instructive and unexpected ways. There is good reason for this return. These voices are poetic yet strident, theoretical but immediately practical to the particularities of struggle. These writings on colonialism, race, class, violence, and governance avoid abstract musing – and the polish and perfection of argument that goes along with it. Instead, they are timely statements made with great urgency. The assumed audience of African anticolonial thought was often not scholars, but rather one’s immediate and intimate comrades. The horizons of these texts and arguments often contain futures filled with possibility, even if the specific outlines are not entirely discernable in the present moment.

Several recent books have argued, in different ways, that returning to thinkers of African anticolonial struggle greatly enriches the theoretical understandings and political struggles of the present. Gary Wilder’s Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (2015), Robbie Shilliam’s The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections (2015), and Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason (2017) all make the compelling argument that the ideas, concepts, and modes of argument developed during anticolonial struggles in Africa and by the African diaspora are uniquely suited to help make sense of – and intervene into – the present. Unlike previous debates about ‘African philosophy’ or the popular turn towards ‘comparative’ or ‘global’ political theory, these three authors neither seek to ‘bring’ black and African voices ‘into’ an academic field; nor do they take anticolonial thought as confined to a location, limited to specific set of ‘problems’, or focused exclusively on the aim of national independence. Instead, Wilder, Shilliam, and Mbembe treat the work of anticolonialism as a human inheritance, one that transcends time and space. Wilder, for example, clearly states that he is less interested in ‘provincializ[ing] Europe’ than in working to ‘deprovincialize Africa and the Antilles’ (p. 10). To do so, he tackles the political and intellectual work of Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor in ways that force attention to their broader commitment to articulating a post-national (and post-continental) human politics, as a radical critique of Western modernity rather than the limited plotting of national independence or a black political identity. Similarly, Shilliam foregrounds the epistemic and manifest networks through which the liberatory desires embedded within black power movements and RasTafari spiritual practices circulated among religious, activist, and youth communities in Aotearoa (New Zealand) and beyond. Mbembe also rejects the compartmentalization of ‘Africa’ from the world, demonstrating that the racialized practices and knowledges once used to justify the colonization of Africa have become widely generalized beyond race. The political and epistemic practices that used ‘Black’ and ‘Africa’ as references to concoct racialized categories have become universalized beyond race.

These authors share a commitment to rereading African peoples, practices, and thought – especially as they relate to the refusal of the Western modern and colonial project – as central to understanding the contemporary condition. They contextualize anticolonial thinkers within their specific conjuncture, while taking care not to reduce their arguments to these temporal and spatial contexts. This work short-circuits the all-to-common assumption that the anticolonial project is a finished – or largely failed – project. However, rather than rebutting such accusations, Wilder’s Freedom Time gracefully argues that such claims are only relevant if one assumes that Césaire and Senghor, the two protagonists of his book, were primarily concerned with ending colonial rule within particular geographical spaces. Wilder argues that contemporary readers often miss the fact that these two thinkers understood their complex intellectual and political projects as engaged in a wholesale rebuilding of modern humanity beyond the nation-state. As such, the work of Césaire and Senghor should not be understood through the lens of national independence, but rather read for the not-yet-realized political visions they contain. Wilder writes: ‘Scholarship long promoted one-sided understandings of Césaire and Senghor as either essentialist nativists or naïve humanists…Negritude, whether embraced or criticized, was treated as an affirmative theory of Africanity rather than a critical theory of modernity’ (p. 8). Wilder argues instead that Césaire and Senghor actually reject ‘the doxa that self-determination required state sovereignty’ and instead proceeded from a position that ‘colonial peoples cannot presume to know a priori which political arrangements would best allow them to pursue substantive freedom’ (p. 2). In this way, Césaire and Senghor were intellectuals who lived as complex and fluid thinkers engaged in a ‘pragmatic orientation’ that ‘was inseparable from a utopian commitment to political imagination and anticipatory politics through which they hoped to transcend the very idea of France, remake the world, and inaugurate a new epoch of human history’ (p. 2). This requires understanding Césaire and Senghor as practicing a form of thinking that is simultaneously ‘strategic and principled, gradualist and revolutionary, realist and vision, timely and untimely’ (p. 2).

Wilder’s book alternates chapters between Césaire and Senghor, tracing the evolution, exchange, and collaboration between these two intellectuals, as well as tracing how their ideas evolved over the course of their engagement with party and state politics. Reading these texts as already instantiated within a political terrain makes it possible to grasp their full nuance. For example, in a chapter on Senghor’s African socialism, Wilder writes that Senghor ‘called neither for France to decolonize Africa nor for Africa to liberate itself, but for Africans to decolonize France’ (p. 214). To this end, African socialism was not simply a political platform, or an effort to remake Marxist theory, but rather a way of imagining the world that left open the possibility that Africans were the agents of ‘planetary salvation’ and ‘human emancipation’ (p. 215). This approach helps explain the seemingly quixotic political commitment that Senghor held concerning regional federalism and his insistence on maintaining a fraternal relationship between Senegal and France (two political positions often cited as evidence of his inability to uphold the true promise of national independence). Instead, Wilder suggests that thinking ‘with Césaire and Senghor’ requires us to ‘engag[e] a future that might have been’. While the specific conclusions Césaire and Senghor arrive at might not necessarily ‘be applied to our times’, ‘the problems they identified’ still ‘persist’, and their ‘utopian realist thinking, at once concrete and world-historical, still resonates’ (p. 256).

Shilliam’s book, The Black Pacific, similarly traces connections among anticolonial activists and intellectuals across space and time. However, rather than examining the exchange between Francophone Africa, France, and the Caribbean, Shilliam locates his study in the dense relationships between the Māori and Pasifika peoples of Aotearoa (New Zealand) and the ‘children of Legba’. Legba is a reoccurring figure from African cosmology that mediates the spiritual and physical worlds. Shilliam opens with the story of a 1979 exchange between Māori elders and their guests, a black theater troupe and a RasTafari band visiting Aotearoa NZ from England. The elder, or kaumātua, greeted the visitors, saying: ‘everyone being one people’ to which the theater director replied: ‘the ancestors are meeting because we have met’ here today (p. 1). This exchange reflects Shilliam’s larger argument about the already existing ‘deep, global infrastructure of anti-colonial connectivity’ (p. 3). He contrasts these lived and meaningful connections with the colonial ethnographic mapping practices that sought – and still seek – to firmly establish separation between colonial subjects, with a gaze remained firmly trained on Europe. Shilliam counters by offering a ‘decolonial science of “deep relation”’ (p. 13) that draws out the moments of connectivity between the spiritually synchronistic descendants of Legba, the Pacific Island figure of Tāne/Māui, and the Arcadian Hermes within the Western philosophical tradition. In doing so, Shilliam provides evidence of the profound spiritual bonds that ground relations of strength and connectivity. He argues that, while the ‘manifest world is a broadly (post)colonial one, structured through imperial hierarchies that encourage the one-way transmission of political authority, social relations and knowledge’, there also exists alongside this world vast ‘hinterlands of the spiritual domains’ (p. 20). Legba, Tāne/Māui, and the Arcadian Hermes continually assist in that translation and binding of the manifest and spiritual worlds and, in doing so, they eschew a ‘developmentalist understanding of time’ in favor of one that can account for ‘the reparation of ancestral ties’ (p. 21). Re-grounding anticolonialism in this shared spiritual inheritance emphasizes the dense human connections that, through their cultivation, might inform the healing of colonial wounds. Shilliam demonstrates the durability of these deep relations in chapters examining the movement and adaptation of Black Power in Aotearoa NZ, the embrace of the political concept of blackness among the Māori and Pasifika peoples, the spiritual and cultural circulation between liberation, RasTafari, and indigenous Rātana theologies, and the movement of Māori and Pasifika activists between Ethiopia, South Africa, the Caribbean, and the African diaspora in England.

Unlike Wilder and Shilliam, who locate anticolonial thinking and practice within the expansive spatial, temporal, and spiritual realities of specific individuals, Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason engages in nothing less than a rewriting of the history of modernity as the ‘mobiliz[ation]’ of ‘Africa and Blackness’ with the goal of ‘the fabrication of racial subjects’ (p. 129). As a ‘river with many tributaries’, Mbembe’s book examines the evolving nature of race and Blackness within a world in which ‘Europe is no longer the center of gravity’ (p. 1). The book moves rapidly and expansively between theoretical engagements – with Fanon, Césaire, Foucault, Arendt, and others – and the historical events that created both modernity and racialized partition (the slave trade, the Haitian and American Revolutions, the Algerian War, and others). He re-casts ‘the biography’ of the ‘assemblage that is Blackness and race’ into ‘three critical moments’: the Atlantic slave trade, the ‘birth of writing’ marked by Blacks demanding ‘the status of full subjects in the world of the living’ (spanning from the Haitian Revolution, abolition, African decolonization, American civil right movement, to the dismantling of apartheid), and concluding with the current period of ‘neoliberalism’ (p. 3). In this latest period, we now inhabit an economic and racial order defined by the ‘industries of the Silicon Valley and digital technology’, in which ‘time passes quickly’, where workers have been replaced by ‘laboring nomads’, and ‘the tragedy of the multitude’ – comprising ‘superfluous humanity’ – has become ‘that they are unable to be exploited at all’ (p. 3). Within this new epoch, race and Blackness have taken on new forms such that the colonial technologies once developed to separate and manage human beings according to racialized categories have now become replaced by a universalized Blackness that extends beyond race: ‘for the first time in human history, the term “Black” has been generalized. This new fungiblity, this solubility, institutionalized as a new norm of existence and expanded to the entire planet, is what I call the Becoming Black of the world’ (p. 6). Islamophobia, for example, operates according to the traditional logics of racism; however, the characteristics once used to describe supposedly biological races has now been applied to ‘“culture” and “religion”’ (p. 7). While Blackness has become universalized beyond race, Mbembe argues that the ‘Western consciousness of Blackness’ – which reduces humans to ‘a racial subject and site of savage exteriority’ – has always existed alongside the ‘Black consciousness of Blackness’, namely the articulation of Blackness within ‘a long history of radicalism, nourished by struggles for abolition and against capitalism’ (pp. 28, 30). Blackness therefore exists within a ‘manifest dualism’, both ‘the living crypt of capital’ through which ‘skin has been transformed into the form and spirit of merchandise’, but simultaneously ‘the symbol of a conscious desire for life, a force springing forth, buoyant and plastic, fully engaged in the act of creation and capable of living in the midst of several times and several histories at once’ (p. 6). Drawing from these ‘reserves of life’, and the awesome refusal to ‘retreat from humanity’ that defines Black life, makes it possible to maintain the ‘possibility of restitution, reparation, and justice’ (p. 179). For Mbembe, whatever our own ‘horizons of…struggle’ might be today, the fundamental struggle remains ‘how to belong fully in this world that is common to all of us, how to pass from the status of the excluded to the status of the right-holder, how to participate in the construction and the distribution of the world’ – that is, the creation of a ‘world in common’ (p. 176).

Taken together, these three books offer insights into the potential benefits of grounding contemporary political and theoretical practices within the contours of African anticolonial thought, widely understood. First, all three are fundamentally concerned with the question of time and temporality. While colonialism is still often studied in a linear fashion – representing a break from a pre-colonial past, and eventually giving way to a post-colonial present (Cooper, 2002, pp. 14–16) – these three authors highlight how emancipatory conceptions of freedom require tarrying with modernist, developmentalist conceptions of time. Mbembe points out, for example, that the ‘remembrance among Blacks depend[s] to a large extent on the critique of time…Time is born out of the contingent, ambiguous, and contradictory relationship that we maintain with things, with the world, or with the body and its doubles’ (p. 121). In Freedom Time, Wilder examines ‘how a given historical epoch many not be identical with itself and historical tenses may blur and interpenetrate’ (p. 15). This attention to time and temporality allows the past to become more malleable and contingent and, thus, the future becomes more open. Wilder highlights this point, situating his book within the ‘postwar opening’ – a historical moment that was fluid, contested, and heterodox, existing between ‘earlier moments of epochal transition’ (i.e., 1790s–1840) and our ‘contemporary conjuncture’ (p. 14).

Second, these three books demand that we examine the relationships between the possible politics, economics, and epistemologies within the academy and those demanded by a still-very-present anticolonial politics. For example, Shilliam reminds us that if we aim for ‘epistemic justice’, then the ‘seedbed of such a decolonial project’ cannot ‘be found in academic discourse but in the living knowledge traditions of colonized peoples’ (p. 7). If one takes this argument seriously then both ‘personal and institutional’ anticolonial practice within the academy requires acknowledging that even our own ‘self-reflexivity’ is not ‘a unique product of modernity’ but rather an ‘institutionally traditional’ form of knowledge, and one that demands that any claim about the ‘superiority of Western academia’ be ‘radically questioned’ (p. 9). Unlike academic, colonial, and Western sciences, ‘decolonial science cultivates knowledge, it does not produce’ knowledge – production is an act of extending the self, while the cultivation of knowledge requires that we ‘till’ in order to ‘turn matter around and fold back on itself so as to rebuild and encourage growth’ (p. 24). Cultivating knowledge involves planting and tending seeds for the unexpected, unknown, and even impossible. The decolonial science of deep relations, therefore, engages in the cultivation of its own ‘biotope’, involving a ‘circulatory’ and ‘constant oxygenation process’, thereby establishing a ‘grounding’ of its own (p. 25).

Finally, these three texts share a common affirmation of a politics of freedom, of solidarity, and interconnectedness that is both extremely fragile yet durable beyond imagination. Wilder, Shilliam, and Mbembe insist that anticolonial thought and practices are already embedded within the present, and remain part of our human inheritance. They also suggest that turning to this body of work makes it possible to understand political freedom and human emancipation as a project that remains radically inclusive, spatially expansive, and temporally heterodox – both already present, rooted in the past, and always on the horizon.

#### The aff’s hunt for a rethinking of thinking comes at the expense of conceptualizing change – that cedes control to the colonizer and reinforces binaries that justified colonialism in the first place. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of this world allows solidarity to enact a concretely cosmopolitan politics.

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These key terms illuminate crucial aspects of what made Césaire a distinctive thinker whose critical voice may continue to resonate for us today. But in order to attend to Césaire as he did his predecessors—as a contemporary— we should recognize how his intellectual orientation and insights brush against the grain of many current theoretical tendencies. In both critical theory and postcolonial studies, the standard operation is to unmask purportedly universal categories as socially constructed, culturally particular, and implicated in practices, systems, and logics of domination. These are indispensable critical moves. But this approach often devolves into a hunt for traces of universalism or humanism, whether in textual artifacts or political projects, in order to reveal the regressive or oppressive essence of the object. This “aha” moment thus becomes the punch line of the discussion rather than the starting point for analysis. Such fears of complicity with power do not only belie a longing for intellectual and political purity. They also make it difficult to think dialectically, to identify aspects of given arrangements that may point beyond their actually existing forms.

The current insistence on negative critique also makes scholars reluctant to identify desirable alternatives and specify the kind of world they might want to create. But what do we concede if we are unable or unwilling to risk affirming more just, more human, ways of being to which we can say “yes”? It is not easy for radical thinkers to reconcile a nonprescriptive orientation to a radically open future with the imperative to envision more desirable arrangements (Coronil 2011). But ignoring or deferring the challenge does not make it disappear. Following anticolonial thinkers like Césaire, especially those located within the black Atlantic critical tradition, may remind us not to forfeit categories such as freedom, justice, democracy, solidarity, and humanity to the dominant actors who have instrumentalized and degraded them.

Given this dilemma, the attention paid to Vivek Chibber’s recent polemic against subaltern studies is not surprising. Such attention, however, seems to be less about the merits of his universalist Marxism than about a sense of some of the limitations and impasses into which certain currents of postcolonial thinking have led (Chibber 2013).7 Partha Chatterjee himself has recently written, “The task, as it now stands, cannot . . . be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods mobilized in Subaltern Studies . . . what is needed are new projects” (2012a: 44). He suggests that such projects should probably focus on “cultural history” and “popular culture” with a renewed focus on visual materials and embodied practices rather than written texts and on ethnography rather than intellectual history. Moreover, he links this invitation to study “the ethnographic, the practical, the everyday and the local” to a focus on subnational “regional formations” and “minority cultures” and languages whose specificities, he observes, had not been sufficiently engaged by earlier subaltern studies research on “India,” “Pakistan,” or “Bangladesh” (47–49). Valuable as such studies would surely be, it is not clear how a renewed focus on locality, with place-based assumptions about territory, consciousness, and categories, could do the kind of critical work necessary to grasp the deep shifts in political logics, structures, and practices that characterize the world-historical present. On the contrary, such approaches risk reproducing precisely the culturalist and territorialist assumptions about political identification and affiliation that need to be rethought in light of contemporary conditions.8

Chatterjee’s surprising emphasis on local ethnography seems consistent with one trend in postcolonial thinking that risks reviving the types of civilizational thinking, and associated assumptions about origins and authenticity, that it had earlier set out to dismantle (Chakrabarty 2007; Mah- mood 2005; Mignolo 2011). Consider the important ways that Talal Asad has invited us to rethink liberal assumptions about “tradition,” with respect to liberal and nonliberal forms of life. In dialogue with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alasdair MacIntyre, Asad (1986) has developed a powerful critique of liberal secularism—and the secularist logic that subtends many modern liberal states—from the standpoint of embodied and discursive traditions. On the one hand, he reminds us that “Islamic tradition” is neither singular nor unchanging; it is a structured and dynamic space for reasoned argument. On the other hand, he reminds us that despite liberalism’s claims to post- traditional neutrality, it too constitutes a particular tradition (albeit one that defines itself in opposition to inherited, embodied, and practice-oriented forms of tradition-based reasoning).

Asad’s genealogical insights have rightly informed recent critiques of Western liberal ideologies, states, and politics especially regarding their arrogant, condescending, and violent responses to tradition-rooted practices and practitioners, whether outside or inside the West. But his interventions, however unintentionally, have also led scholars to establish dubious chains of equivalence between modernity, the West, and liberalism. Such operations seem to disregard Asad’s important invitation to understand traditions as capacious, heterogeneous, and dynamic spaces of inquiry, disputation, and revision, not simply as a set of rigid behavioral scripts, unchanging cultural formulas, or dogmatic ideological precepts. This reduction of political modernity to a one-dimensional liberalism obscures, for example, the many currents of progressive antiliberalism within the tradition of modern Western political thought. It fails to recognize the significant number of non-European colonial intellectuals engaged in anti-imperial struggles who were active participants in such “traditions within traditions.” It also disregards the contradictions within and redeemable fragments of even liberal political thinking, fragments that, if realized, might point far beyond, and possibly explode, liberalism itself.

To reify modern or Western politics into a static and stereotypical liberalism is to risk practicing an unfortunate form of “Occidentalism” that would reinforce archaic civilizational assumptions about incommensurable and unrelated worlds (and worldviews) and disregard the actual history and open possibilities for practices of cross-cultural solidarity whereby anti-imperial actors outside Europe could enter into dialogue or affiliate with, or even discover ways that they are already situated within, counterhegemonic “Western” political traditions. Critics have rightly mobilized singularity, incommensurability, or untranslatability against liberal attempts to discover an abstract humanity and thereby discount situated and embodied forms of life. But the question is whether we treat incommensurability or untranslatability as an epistemological or political limit or as an always imperfect starting point for practices of dialogue, coordination, affiliation, reciprocity, solidarity. For isn’t the impossibility of full transparency or undifferentiated unity simply the unavoidable condition within which all communication, sociality, and politics must be attempted?9

My point is not to congratulate dissident currents within the West, let alone to recuperate liberalism. It is rather to approach radical and emancipatory politics from a place of not-already-knowing, of not presuming to know a priori which aspects of a tradition are irredeemable, which traditions may become allies or habitations, what the boundaries of (thoroughly plastic) traditions must be. This nondogmatic and experimental orientation to politics, traditions, and concepts is one of the most precious and timely gifts that Césaire may offer to us now. He practiced a concrete cosmopolitan relationship to modern traditions of philosophy, aesthetics, and politics, one that was highly developed by the robust tradition of black Atlantic criticism within which he was firmly rooted along with predecessors (e.g., Toussaint and W. E. B. DuBois), contemporaries (e.g., C. L. R. James, James Baldwin, Suzanne Césaire, Senghor), and descendants (e.g., Fanon, Edouard Glissant, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Achille Mbembe, David Scott).

Understandable concerns about totalizing explanation and Eurocentric evaluation have led a generation of scholars to insist on the incommensurable alterity of non-European forms of thought. But perhaps we should be concerned less exclusively with unmasking universalisms as covert European particularism than with also challenging the assumption that the universal is European property. I read Césaire not in order to provincialize European concepts but to deprovincialize Antillean thinking. Césaire’s critical reworkings remind us that the supposedly European categories of political modernity properly belong as much to the African and Caribbean actors who coproduced them as to the inhabitants of continental Europe. Similarly, African and Caribbean thinkers, no less than their continental counterparts, produced abstract and general propositions about “humanity,” “history,” and “the world.” In contrast to invocations of multiple modernities, Césaire never granted to Europe possession of a modernity or universality or humanity that was always already translocal and fundamentally Caribbean. He never treated self-determination, emancipation, freedom, equality, or justice as essentially European and foreign. Césaire’s intellectual and political interventions radically challenged reductive territorialist approaches to social thought. He refused to concede that “France” was an ethnic or continental entity, that Martinique was not in some real way internal to “French” society and politics, or that he was situated outside of modern critical traditions. Thus his ongoing and unapologetic engagements with Hegel, Marx, Proudhon, Nietzsche, Lautréamont, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Bergson, Freud, Breton, Frobenius, and Lenin, alongside his many African, Antillean, and African American interlocutors.

The sonic blurring between “here” and “hear” in the title of this essay is meant to signal not only the contemporaneity of Césaire’s thought for us here now but the imperative that we open ourselves to his presence and recognize his actuality across the epochal divide by hearing what he actually said. This gesture builds on Walter Benjamin’s insight that every now is a “now of recognizability” whereby “what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation” through which past epochs become newly legible (1999: 462). I also follow Césaire himself, who engaged in dialogue with predecessors as if they were contemporaries and who addressed future interlocutors directly as if they were already present. Like Benjamin, Césaire practiced a form of radical remembrance that connected outmoded pasts to charged presents. This attention to vital histories was bound up with a poetic politics that identified transformative possibilities dwelling within existing arrangements and a proleptic politics that anticipated seemingly impossible futures by trying to enact them concretely in the here and now. But Césaire can only speak to us now if we listen rather than presume to know what someone like him in his situation must have, or should have, been saying.

Until very recently, scholarship on his work has been overdetermined by methodological nationalism (that puzzles over his refusal to pursue state sovereignty), identitarian culturalism (that debates how adequately Césaire expressed Antillean lived experience and whether or not he was an essentialist), and a disciplinary division of labor (that too often splits his poetry, criticism, and politics into separate domains). Generally, Cold War scholarship was shaped by a need to evaluate him in relation to canonical anticolonial nationalists and fit him into a narrative of decolonization-as-national-independence. This has made it difficult to recognize the epochal character, world-making ambition, and global sensibility of his political reflections.

Faced with the promise of decolonization, Césaire conjugated concrete acts with political imagination in ways that displaced conventional oppositions between aesthetics and politics, realism and utopia, pragmatism and principle. Such efforts were animated by what I have been calling radical literalism and utopian realism and which he called inflection and poetic knowledge. He regarded freedom as a problem whose institutional solution was not self-evident and could only be situational. His interventions demonstrated the nonnecessary relationship between colonial emancipation, popular sovereignty, and self-determination, on the one hand, and territorial state sovereignty and national liberation, on the other. He pursued cosmopolitan aims concretely through transcultural practices and by attempting to invent new political forms through which to ground plural and postnational democratic arrangements.

We should recognize that Césaire formulated a critique not of Western civilization from the standpoint of African or Antillean culture but of modern Western racism, imperialism, and capitalism from the standpoint of Antillean and African historical situations and experiences. More generally, it was a critique of an alienated and alienating modernity from the standpoint of embodied and poetic ways of being, knowing, and relating (to self, others, and world). Above all, Césaire recognized residues of, and resources for, more just, human, and integrated ways of living together within Antillean, African, and European texts, traditions, forms, histories, and conditions. In his view, Antilleans—as culturally particular actors, imperial subjects, New World denizens, moderns, and humans—were their rightful heirs. He was concerned less with defining culturally authentic concepts, spaces, and arrangements for Antilleans (apart from Europe or uncontaminated by modernity) than with overcoming imperialism, in solidarity with other struggling peoples, in order to establish less alienated forms of human life globally.

Remembering Césaire’s insistence that modern currents of radicalism were shared legacies and common property may help us to rethink inherited assumptions about the relation between territory, ethnicity, consciousness, and interest (Buck-Morss 2009, 2010). They invite us to deterritorialize social thought and to decolonize intellectual history. This is a matter not of valorizing non-European forms of knowledge, as important as such a move certainly is, but of questioning the presumptive boundaries of “Europe” itself—by recognizing the larger scales on which modern social thought was forged and of appreciating that colonial societies produced self-reflexive thinkers concerned with large-scale processes and future prospects. We can thereby recognize Césaire as a situated postwar thinker of the postwar world, one of whose primary aims was to place into question the very categories “France,” “Europe,” and “the West” by way of an immanent critique of late imperial politics. He envisioned postnational arrangements through which humanity could attempt to overcome the alienating antinomies that had impoverished the quality of life in overseas colonies and European metropoles. His situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism should thus be placed in a constellation of modern emancipatory thinking oriented toward worldwide human freedom that included antiracist, anti-imperial, internationalist, and socialist thinkers from a range of traditions: black Atlantic, First Internationalist, global anarchist, Western Marxist, Marxist humanist, Third Worldist.

Césaire believed that the future of humanity depended in some sense on its recovering a lost poetic relation to “the throbbing newness of the world.” Why not regard Césaire’s “humanism made to the measure of the world” as a starting point for our critical thinking about the contemporary situation and the kind of world we would like to create. Césaire, like Toussaint before him, addressed future interlocutors directly. At the same time, his thinking about future possibilities was refracted through dialogue with predecessors like Toussaint. This is how I understand what one of his heirs, Glissant, means by “a prophetic vision of the past” based on “the identification of a painful notion of time and its full projection forward into the future” (1989: 64; see also Glissant 2005: 15, 16). Césaire once wrote of Schoelcher, the socialist republican architect of the 1848 abolition of slavery in France, that it would be “useless to commemorate him if we had not decided to imitate his politics” (1948a: 28). In this spirit I hope that the recent resurgence of interest in Césaire is not only treated as an occasion to honor his memory but is seized as an opportunity to hear his transgenerational address. We can thus think with Césaire about the relation between existing theoretical frameworks, the world we are confronting, and urgent political desires— especially with regard to the history of empire and the role of colonial intellectuals as modern thinkers of global processes.

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#### 1. Core anti-trust laws are used world-wide to target corporate power deployed against people of color. Debating about legal avenues is key to build up social movements that challenge power.

Kate Andrias and Benjamin I. Sachs 21, Kate Andrias is Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Benjamin I. Sachs is Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and Industry, Harvard Law School, “Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality,” 130 Yale L.J. 546, January 2021, lexis.

[\*548] INTRODUCTION

Among the painful truths made evident by COVID-19 are the deep inequality of American society and the profound inadequacy of our social-welfare infrastructure. The nation's lack of comprehensive health care, 1Link to the text of the noteits underfunded and inefficient system of unemployment insurance, 2Link to the text of the noteand weak workplace safety and health guarantees, 3Link to the text of the notealong with nearly nonexistent paid sick leave, 4Link to the text of the notedebtor-forgiveness rules, 5Link to the text of the noteand tenant protections 6Link to the text of the noteleave poor and working-class communities--particularly communities of color--dangerously exposed to the ravages of this pandemic, both physical and economic. 7Link to the text of the noteAmerica's weak social safety net is, in turn, a product of a profound failure that has plagued American democracy for decades now: the wealthy exercising vastly disproportionate power over politics and government. 8Link to the text of the note

[\*549] Indeed, public faith in American democracy is at near-record lows, and increasing numbers of Americans report that they no longer feel confident in the health of their democratic institutions. When asked why, many say that money has too much of an influence on politics and that politicians are unresponsive to the concerns of regular Americans. 9Link to the text of the noteResearch supports these fears, showing both that wealthy individuals are spending record sums on electoral politics 10Link to the text of the noteand that elected officials are at best only weakly accountable to nonwealthy constituents. 11Link to the text of the note [\*550] As political scientist Martin Gilens has observed, "[W]hen preferences between the well-off and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor." 12Link to the text of the note

Of course, democracy does not require that policymaking always follow majority will or the median voter's preferences. But democracy, as well as the faith citizens have in their government, falters when lawmakers persistently disregard the priorities of nonwealthy citizens.

Much of the legal scholarship (and public commentary) concerned with this democracy deficit focuses on the increased flow of money into electoral politics and advocates for stemming that flow. 13Link to the text of the noteScholars writing in this vein criticize the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, exemplified by Citizens United v. FEC, that has enabled unfettered campaign spending. 14Link to the text of the noteThey offer a range of reforms designed to limit the flow of money into elections, many of which would require a change in the composition of the Supreme Court or the ratification of a constitutional amendment. 15Link to the text of the noteA related group of scholars advocates for shielding the legislative and administrative process from money's influence through, for example, lobbying restrictions and disclosure requirements. 16Link to the text of the note

[\*551] A second robust body of scholarship focuses not on insulating the political process from money but on trying to ensure equal rights of individuals to participate in the governance process through elections. These scholars criticize barriers to equal voting rights, including contemporary uses of gerrymandering and legislation that impose hurdles on individual voters' ability to exercise the franchise or minimize the effective voting power of particular constituents. 17Link to the text of the noteScholars urge both doctrinal and legislative reform that would ensure more equal rights of participation.

In the last few years, a third approach has begun to emerge in the legal scholarship. This approach begins by recognizing the difficulty--both practical and constitutional--of keeping money out of politics. It also recognizes that while equal voting and participation rights are critical to the goal of combatting political inequality, they are not enough to ensure political equality in a system where wealth functions so prominently as an independent source of political influence. Thus, this third approach moves beyond campaign finance and individual participation rights and focuses instead on what we will call countervailing power. In particular, this approach is concerned with the ability of mass-membership organizations to equalize the political voice of citizens who lack the political influence that comes from wealth. 18Link to the text of the note

The beneficial effects of countervailing, mass-membership organizations are well known to theorists and researchers of democracy. 19Link to the text of the notePut simply, such groups increase political equality by building and consolidating political power for the [\*552] nonwealthy, thus serving as counterweights to the political influence of the rich. Mass-membership organizations can serve in this capacity because, at bottom, they aggregate the political resources and political power of people who, acting as individuals, are disempowered relative to wealthy individuals and institutions. 20Link to the text of the noteMore particularly, mass-membership organizations enable pooling of politically relevant resources, including money, among individuals with fewsuch resources; they provide information to decisionmakers about ordinary citizens' views; they navigate opaque and fragmented government structures, thereby enabling citizens to monitor government behavior; and they allow citizens to hold decisionmakers accountable. And, in fact, when citizens are organized into mass-membership associations that are active in the political sphere, researchers find an exception to the general rule that policymakers are disproportionally responsive to the preferences and concerns of the wealthy. 21Link to the text of the note

Over recent decades, however, there has been a decline in broad-based, massmembership organizations of low- and middle-income Americans. 22Link to the text of the noteThis decline in countervailing organizations has exacerbated the political distortions caused by the increase in political spending by the wealthy. But the capacity for countervailing organizations to address the distorting effects of wealth raises a critical question for legal scholars: How can law facilitate the construction of countervailing organizations among the nonwealthy? Put differently, how can law facilitate political organizing among Americans whose voices are drowned out by the distorting effects of wealth? That is the question we address in this Article.

Recently, legal scholars have begun to address related topics. For example, K. Sabeel Rahman and Miriam Seifter have written about ways that participation in administrative processes can improve the organizational strength of citizen groups. Thus, Rahman argues for designing administrative processes in ways that enhance the countervailing power of ordinary citizens, 23Link to the text of the notewhile Seifter urges administrative-law scholars to pay attention to the characteristics of interest groups participating in the administrative process and to consider "looking [\*553] within interest groups," referencing the manner by which interest groups determine the views of their constituents, "to illuminate the quality and nature of participation in administrative governance." 24Link to the text of the noteTabatha Abu El-Haj has urged greater use of universal benefits and targeted philanthropy, to encourage the growth of mass-membership organizations, since both "create reasons to organize on the part of beneficiaries." 25Link to the text of the noteBoth of us have written about the countervailing role that labor organizations can play in politics. 26Link to the text of the noteAnd Daryl Levinson and one of us have written about the ways in which ordinary public policy often has the effect--and at times the intent--of mobilizing political organization around the policy. 27Link to the text of the note

Meanwhile, another group of legal scholars has highlighted the importance of social movements and their organizations in legal change, focusing on how movements shape decisionmaking by courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. 28Link to the text of the noteIn particular, a rich literature has developed on the relationship between popular mobilization and evolving constitutional principles, 29Link to the text of the noteand on [\*554] how "cause lawyers" can best serve social movements. 30Link to the text of the noteMore recently, there has been a resurgence of scholarship that "cogenerates legal meaning alongside left social movements, their organizing, and their visions." 31Link to the text of the noteThis work builds on an older tradition of critical legal studies and critical race theory that interrogates the limits of traditional legal rights in bringing about progressive social change given the political, economic, and social conditions that systematically disadvantage poor people and people of color. 32Link to the text of the note

To date, however, no one has tackled directly the question that we pose here. 33Link to the text of the noteRather than asking how the enactment of substantive legislation or administrative-participation mechanisms might boost organizing, how social [\*555] movements can or hope to reshape law, or how a focus on traditional legal rights disables fundamental social change, we ask how law could be used explicitly and directly to enable low- and middle-income Americans to build their own socialmovement organizations for political power.

The question is particularly urgent today as the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated society's existing inequalities. Working-class communities, especially low- and middle-income people of color, have experienced hardships as a result of the disease to a far greater extent than the wealthy--from massive unemployment to dangerous working conditions, from food insecurity to rising debt and risk of eviction. 34Link to the text of the noteThe suffering wrought by the pandemic, as well as by the financial crisis of 2008, has led to an upsurge in protests by low- and middle-income Americans, particularly among workers, tenants, and debtors. 35Link to the text of the noteAt the same time, endemic violence against Black communities, including the recent killing of George Floyd, has led to widespread organizing around issues of racial justice. 36Link to the text of the noteThese movements demand that government respond to the [\*556] concerns of ordinary Americans and attempt to elicit better treatment from powerful actors. Yet, despite their promise, such movements face significant obstacles in translating their members' anger into robust and lasting political power. 37Link to the text of the noteA pressing task, therefore, is to ask how law can facilitate and protect these new and revived protest movements, helping to create durable organizations that can exercise sustained power in the political economy.

We start from the premise that the robustness of countervailing, mass-membership organizations should be understood as a problem both of and for law. The shape of civil society and organizational life is already a product of legal structures and rules. 38Link to the text of the noteAnd although law has frequently been a tool of oppression, rather than of empowerment, of poor and working-class people and movements, 39Link to the text of the notealternative legal regimes that encourage the growth of and the exercise of power by social-movement organizations of the poor and working class are possible. Indeed, for those who are committed to decreasing political inequality, alternative legal structures that encourage the growth of countervailing organizations are imperative.

In analyzing how legal and institutional reforms could facilitate a different picture of organizational and political life in the United States, we draw from the successes and failures of labor law--the area of U.S. law that most explicitly and directly creates a right to collective organization for working people--while also moving beyond that context to literature considering "how, in what forms, and under what conditions social movements become a force for social and political change." 40Link to the text of the noteWe do not attempt to adjudicate priority among factors that [\*557] contribute to successful organizing, nor do we attempt to build an exhaustive list of such factors. Instead, we consolidate factors that have two attributes: (1) they are likely to contribute to the successful building of membership organizations among poor and working-class people, and (2) their existence or development might be enabled by law.

We recognize that some factors, undoubtedly critical to successful organizing, are beyond the reach of our proposal. For example, sociologists and historians have demonstrated that several structural opportunities helped facilitate the growth of the Civil Rights movement, including the collapse of cotton; the increase in Black migration and electoral strength; and the advent of World War II and the Cold War. 41Link to the text of the noteThese kinds of objective structural conditions, exogenous to movements themselves, are frequently important to movement formation, but they cannot be directly affected by the kinds of legal reforms we suggest. Likewise, sociologists have shown that strategic leadership within organizations is critical to movement success, 42Link to the text of the notebut internal leadership dynamics are not easily affected through legal regulation. 43Link to the text of the note

Three additional principles guide our analysis. First, because small-scale, concrete victories are essential to successful organizing, and because organizing tends to be most successful among people with shared identities and existing relationships, we focus on reforms that enable organizing within particular structures of authority and resource relations. By way of examples, we consider organizing among workers, tenants, debtors, and recipients of public benefits. We pick these contexts in part because they are ones rife with exploitation and [\*558] power imbalances and populated by the relevant income groups, and in part because they are home to important organizing efforts, both historical and contemporary. 44Link to the text of the noteWe do not suggest that these are the only relevant contexts in which our suggestions might be explored, nor do we in any sense imply that broader organizational development encompassing poor and working-class people as a whole is impossible or ineffective. In fact, the context-specific organizing regimes we envision might well facilitate broader community-based and political organization. However, we leave for another day exploration of how the law might directly enable broad-based political organization--say, a political organization of all poor people or a political-party system that incentivizes grassroots participation among nonwealthy individuals. 45Link to the text of the note

Second, we focus on how law can build organization, as opposed to more amorphous configurations of insurgency. The organizations our reforms seek to facilitate are very much social-movement actors, in that they seek to change "elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society." 46Link to the text of the noteBut the goal is to encourage enduring organization that can wield sustained, [\*559] countervailing power. 47Link to the text of the noteThus, our approach rejects the idea that formal structures facilitated by law are necessarily deradicalizing and inimical to social change. 48Link to the text of the note

Finally, our focus is on how law can facilitate organizations of working-class and poor Americans--not on either of two other questions: one, how law could be designed specifically to enhance the political power of communities of color, or two, how law could encourage the formation of interest groups generally. The first question could not be more critical. Just as our government is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, it is also disproportionately responsive to white people, 49Link to the text of the noteand the crisis of structural racism is perhaps the most acute we face as a nation. As such, a program for building political power among communities of color is just as necessary as a program for building power among workers and the poor. But it is also true that our focus on working and poor Americans ought, in practice, and in part due to the crisis of structural racism itself, to amount to a program for building power among and by communities of color. This is not the exclusive reach of our proposals, and continued attention must be paid to ensure that racial inequities do not infect the political organizing we aspire to enable. But because people of color are over-represented in the sectors of the population that we do address--low-income workers, tenants, government-benefits recipients, debtors--these communities would likely benefit from the success of our proposals. As to the second question, while a more expansive civil society may bring a host of benefits, including greater social cohesion and civic education, this Article's concern is with building organizations that can serve as a countervailing force to the extraordinary power of economic elites in our political economy. 50Link to the text of the note

[\*560] We argue that a legal regime designed to enable this kind of organizing should have several components. First, the law should grant collective rights in an explicit and direct way so as to create a "frame" that encourages organizing. Second, as importantly, though more prosaically, the law should provide for a reliable, administrable, and sustainable source of financial, informational, human, and other relevant resources. Third, the law should guarantee free spaces--both physical and digital--in which movement organization can occur, free from surveillance or control. Fourth, the law should remove barriers to participation, both by protecting all those involved from retaliation--no worker may be fired, no tenant evicted, no debtor penalized, and no welfare recipient deprived of benefits because they are active in or supportive of the movement's efforts--and by removing material obstacles that make it difficult for poor and working people to organize. Fifth, the law should provide the organizations with ways to make material change in their members' lives and should create mechanisms for the exercise of real political and economic power, for example by providing the right to "bargain" with the relevant set of private actors and by facilitating organizational participation in governmental processes. Finally, the law should enable contestation and disruption, offering protections for the right to protest and strike. 51Link to the text of the note

The particulars necessarily vary by context. For example, a law designed to generate organizing among tenants would start by affirmatively granting tenants the right to form and join tenant unions. It would grant such unions the right to access information and landlord property for organizational purposes. It would vest the organization with authority to collect dues payments through deductions from rent payments. It would mandate that landlords negotiate with tenants' organizations over rent and housing conditions. It would ensure that organizations have special rights of participation in administrative processes related to housing policy. And it would provide for the right of tenants to engage in rent strikes and protests, free from retaliation. A law designed to facilitate organizing among debtors would similarly create a collective frame, provide a mechanism for funding, protect against retaliation, mandate bargaining and [\*561] rights of participation in governance, and protect the right to protest and strike, but a debtor-organizing law might not provide for access to physical spaces, instead putting more emphasis on providing information and enabling online organizing.

Some of our proposals will generate resistance--theoretical, legal, and political. And, indeed, we concede that our approach has limitations. For example, we do not attempt to articulate the optimal level of political influence that the organizations in question ought to enjoy, nor a way of measuring when and whether they have become sufficiently strong. As Richard Pildes has written in a related context, we believe it is possible to "identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong without a precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or right." 52Link to the text of the noteIn addition, the scope of our inquiry is limited to problems of economic inequality. Yet we do not mean in any way to minimize other aspects of inequality, including racial and gender discrimination and hierarchy, which are both inseparable from economic inequality and worthy of separate examination and intervention. To that end, we believe law ought to require inclusion and nondiscrimination among poor and working people's social-movement organizations. 53Link to the text of the note

Finally, we recognize both that our recommendations will not provide a panacea to the imbalance in power that characterizes our political economy and that our proposals will be difficult to enact. Indeed, although we suggest a range of possible reforms and explain how they could be achieved, the goal is to illuminate law's constitutive potential and to suggest a path for further work, not to provide a comprehensive blueprint. 54Link to the text of the noteIn short, analysis of what makes poor and working people's social-movement organizations succeed helps show that law [\*562] can make a difference--and that the absence of such law is a choice, one we believe our society cannot afford to make. 55Link to the text of the note

#### 4. Turn.

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Throughout this essay, I have felt uncomfortable with much of the language I have used. I do not like the tone that gets set when words like "client services" and "formerly homeless individual" are repeatedly used. Yet this is the language that is used in the domain of employment services - by the groups who are doing it, by the governmental agencies that are funding and regulating it, and by the academics who are evaluating and researching it. I [\*452] could create my own different language to describe what very low income people need in the way of help with finding jobs. Yet the project of seeking to link a pragmatic internal critique with the abolitionist aspiration is one that challenges us to speak inside of that language at the same time that we seek to push beyond it. Even as I pursue that dangerous project, I feel qualms about whether the project is worth doing at all, from a political perspective. Perhaps it is best to leave the domain of homeless service programs alone, and concern ourselves instead with the few projects - like the late Mitch Snyder's Center for Creative Non-Violence, or On the Rise in Boston, which empowers homeless women - that do not choose to take the state's money, or to speak its language, and have no confusion about "which side" they are on.

#### Refusal feeds reactionary, right-wing groups.

Marla Zubel 13, Graduate Student in Cultural Studies and Comparative Literature, University of Minnesota, “The Utopian Catastrophism of Insurrectionary Politics,” The New Everyday, 2-21-2013, http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/tne/pieces/utopian-catastrophism-insurrectionary-politics

The crisis is desirable because it pulls the breaks on the apparatuses of destruction, making impossible their prolongation, and thus opening up at least the possibility for a better world – a world which will be made possible, it seems, by the exercise of a quasi Nietzschean will to power by those willing and able to “take advantage of every collapse in the system.” But the organization (and reorganization) of the world quickly becomes mythologized in this formulation. The crisis, although created by human hands, has run amok and, according to TCI is now entirely beyond human control. Our only hope is to reestablish contact with an “environment” that is no longer “the environment” in order to rediscover the essence of reality which has been obfuscated by the appearance of civilization. In this way, TCI posits a fantasy of a return to the natural “rhythms” of reality, in place of any attempt to actually alter the course of global devastation. It insists upon the social causes of the problem, but simultaneously denies its social solution. From the perspective of communism, this is not only an illogical position, but a profoundly un-revolutionary one. Furthermore, it is unclear who precisely stands to benefit from this crisis. Who is supposed to find ways to increase their “strength” from the “collapse in the system” and who stands to face the “fatal” results of “reestablishing contact” with the environment? Certainly the ability to take advantage of crisis in the manner put forward by TCI depends a great deal upon where one is situated in that crisis. Nowhere is the inadequacy of such utopian catastrophism more painfully apparent than in TCI's premature assessment of autonomous relief efforts in New Orleans. “In the apocalyptic atmosphere [after Hurricane Katrina], life is reorganizing itself” (83) they write. And indeed a certain reorganization has taken place, but not the autonomous one they envisioned. Without disparaging the important work of organizations like Common Ground and The People's Hurricane Relief Fund, it is important for us all to acknowledge that their “daily resistance to the clean-sweep operation of government bulldozers, which are trying to turn that part of the city into a pasture for property developers” (83), has ultimately proven to be little match for the deftness with which the forces of capital reorganize life in the “apocalyptic atmosphere” of crisis10. We should celebrate resistance in all its forms, whether successful or otherwise, but we should also not delude ourselves about our own effectiveness. The example of New Orleans is an but one expression of the relationship between insurrectionary politics and the tendency towards de-linked collectivities, which ultimately prove ineffectual in resisting capitalist exploitation on any meaningful level. Another, more central to TCI's politics, is the insistence on the importance of “the commune.” The Invisible Committee offers a very particular take on this myth-word of revolution. A commune is not an organization or a social milieu, but rather a group of “friends” that “decide upon a common path… "Communes…accept being what they are, where they are. And if possible, a multiplicity of communes…will displaces the institutions of society: family, school union, sports club, etc…A commune forms every time a few people, freed of their individual straitjackets, decide to rely only on themselves and measure their strength against reality. Every wildcat strike is a commune; every building occupied collectively and on a clear basis is a commune…Every commune seeks to be its own base…it seeks to break all economic dependency and all political subjugation" (TCI, 101-102). The commune then, while resisting the atomization of the individual in everyday life under post-industrial capitalism, is also radically decentralized and walled-off from the outside world as it attempts to break all ties to the economic and social reality. In TCI the commune, first and foremost enacts a form of resistance by the very fact if its existence, “It's what makes us say 'we,' and makes that an event” (TCI, 101). But importantly this “we” does not refer to a coming into revolutionary class consciousness. It is an “event” that breaks from reality and then reorganizes itself in the cracks that open up as a result of this break. But rather than just maintaining their boundaries the communes, they claim, are able to significantly confront the state by way of disengaging from it. “Local self-organization superimposes its own geography over the state cartography, scrambling and blurring it: it produces its own secession” (TCI, 108-109). So, while the commune sets up its boundaries against the outside world it also must expand spatially. It must “create territories. Multiply zones of opacity” (TCI, 107). And the purpose of these zones is to “free up the most time for the most people” (104). Time firstly, for the practice of non-alienated social relations on the commune, and secondly, for participation in the insurrectionary event. The insurrection is coming, but what is the insurrection exactly? As a provisional answer one might say that the insurrection is an event, or a series of events, which, like the commune, appears not to be a means to an ends but an ends in itself. The insurrection points to nothing beyond itself. It is the event of its own ungovernability. It is for this reason the authors of TCI write: "We can't help but delight in the fits of anger and disorder wherever they erupt..All the incivilities of the streets should become methodical and systematic, converging in a diffuse, effective guerrilla war that restores us to our ungovernability, our primordial unruliness…rage and politics should never have been separated" (TCI, 110-111). Like Sorel's general strike11, which also calls for the ceaseless quasi-apocalyptic transformation of society, the insurrection fights only for its continuation, and is thus decidedly lacking in specific political content. Or, like the metaphysical ontology of Artaud's “Theater of Cruelty”12 the insurrection allows for the spectacular release of “primordial unruliness” against various aspects of bourgeois conformism (The fact that insurrectionary theories like Sorel's have historically been appropriated by fascism and other right-wing movements will be dealt with momentarily). The insurrection's conception of time, like the “general strike” and “theater of cruelty,” is a static one. Insurrectionary events are removed from a dynamic revolutionary process and signal instead the time of capitalism brought to an abrupt end. Although in TCI the insurrection is uni-directional in so far as it is said to be “coming,” once it begins, time is brought to a standstill. With a nod to that famous graffiti of the May events, the last page of the book reads, it is “impossible to say whether it has been months or years since the 'events' began” (135). Refusing to deal directly with the intrinsically transitory nature of insurrectionary events, the Invisible Committee writes, “The goals of insurrection is to become irreversible. It becomes irreversible when you've defeated both authority and the need for authority, property and the taste for appropriation, hegemony and the desire for hegemony” (130-131). “Hegemony,” here is rejected as authoritarian (the point for Gramsci, of course, was not to do away with hegemony, as such, but for the subaltern classes to overthrow bourgeois hegemony and become hegemonic themselves). The insurrection must be left open, resisting closure in time and consolidation (by a class) in space. Thus, despite its claims to communism, in TCI, the “standpoint of the proletariat”13 or any other standpoint for that matter is nowhere to be found. TCI justifies its anti-class consciousness by arguing that capitalism has all but done away with the working class: "[Labor] can no longer consolidate itself as a force, being outside the center of production process and employed to plug the holes of what has not yet been mechanized…today work is tied less to the economic necessity of producing goods than to the political necessity of producing producers and consumers and of preserving by any means necessary the order of work" (48-49). While such a diagnosis of the post-industrial economies of the West may offer interesting insights into the role of work as a means of social control, to declare the worker entirely outside the production process and therefore irrelevant to the revolutionary transformation of that process, is not only to deny the on-going economic necessity of labor in its variously outsourced forms, but also to obfuscate the material relations of capitalism by way of mystifying production, or, what's worse, uncritically reproducing the fetishization of the labor commodity. This should not be surprising however, for in the generalized climate of catastrophe put forward by TCI, the enemy is authority as such, and not the determinate negation of capitalism by a class, or any other kind of social formation for that matter. An almost hundred year-old debate between Lenin and Kautsky provides in interesting entry point for analyzing TCI's absolute rejection of, and fetishization of authority, over and above its critique of capitalism and, as such, helps to explain its ability to be easily appropriated by the radical right. In Lenin's polemic against Karl Kautsky in The State and Revolution14, he exposes the revolutionary limits of pure negation and its potentially counter-revolutionary consequences. When Kautsky writes, “We can safely leave the solution of the problem of the proletarian dictatorship to the future,” Lenin argues that such an unwillingness to deal with the practical problems of the revolution results in the deformation not only of Marxism but of the revolution itself, “At present the opportunists ask nothing better than to quite safely leave to the future all fundamental questions of the tasks of the proletarian revolution” (Lenin, 353). Lenin goes on to accuse the anarchists of refusing to think through the contradictions of the state in favor of an oversimplified un-dialectical negation. Characterizing the anarchist position, Lenin writes: "'We must think only of destroying the old state machine; it is no use probing into the concrete lessons of earlier proletarian revolutions and analyzing what to put in the place of what has been destroyed, and how,' argues the anarchist (the best of the anarchists, of course, and not those who, following the Kropotkins and Co., trail behind the bourgeoisie). Consequently, the tactics of the anarchist become the tactics of despair instead of a ruthlessly bold revolutionary effort to solve concrete problems while taking into account the practical conditions of the mass movement" (362). The point here is not to uncritically validate Lenin's “bold revolutionary efforts” but it is at least to insist on the need for revolutionary responsibility. For the continual refusal to think through the material complexities of revolutionary strategy in favor of arousing the purely negating force of the insurrection, may prove not only strategically insufficient, but the political neutral “tactics of despair” might prove equally seductive to the far Left as to the far Right.15 The easy slippage from Left libertarianism to Right libertarianism is observable throughout much of the 20th century, and American ideologies of rugged individualism have long provided fertile breeding ground for anti-government sentiments and the idealization of “small is beautiful” style capitalism. The presidential campaigns of Republican Ron Paul (and the recent participation of Ron Paul supporters in the Occupy movement) backed enthusiastically by those self-identifying as belonging to both the Left and the Right, is but the most recent manifestation of this libertarian confusion. But this kind of political ambiguity is nothing new. Both Sorel and Blanqui were taken up enthusiastically by a young Mussolini, whose Nietzsche-inspired 'socialism' made for an easy transition to fascist politics. In Critique of Everyday Life Vol. 216, Henri Lefebvre offers the term “historical drift” for explaining tendency for revolutionary situations and positions to be blown off track. “[Historical drift is] the gap between effective actions and intentions, and the result of events provoked by tactics and strategies…After turmoil comes calm, drift, and the divisions and gaps” (129-130). While TCI would like to insist that, “In truth, there is no gap between what we are, what we do, and what we are becoming” (TCI, 15), even the most revolutionary intentions may prove to have reactionary effects. If the recent appeal of dystopianism in insurrectionary politics may be understood, at least in part, as the historical drift of a Left culture of autonomous utopianism, then TCI should also be wary of historical drift towards right-wing politics. With this in mind, it is useful to remember that the anti-civilization politics of TCI is part of from a long history of 19th and 20th century anxieties around industrialization. In TCI, nightmarish descriptions of alienated life in the modern metropolis give way to rather romantic pastoral desires, “Our dependence on the metropolis – on its medicine, its agriculture, its police – is so great at present that we can't attack it without putting ourselves in danger” (TCI, 106). What is at stake here is not so much a guerrilla fighting strategy of taking to the hills, but rather a retreat from the metropolis for the cultivation of self-sufficiency. “We must start today, in preparation for the days when we'll need more than just a symbolic portion of our nourishment and care (TCI, 107). The intent then is to create a self-sustained space outside the metropolis in which to learn survival skills, as well as from which to attack the forces of the state and capital congealed in the metropolis. If other forms of utopian de-linking wished to wall themselves off from the world, insurrectionary de-linking is unique in that it aims at intentional confrontation with the metropolis in the event of insurrection, but imagines a space free of capitalist contamination from which to plot and regroup. It is in part, this self-sufficient survivalist twist on the insurrection that makes possible TCI's dismissive attitude towards humanity's future. The friendship-group commune has found do-it-yourself, alternative solutions to meeting life's basic needs (not so unlike the Christian fundamentalist back-to-the-lander stockpiling canned good and ammunition in preparation for Armageddon) and so should you. The rejection of the modern city and nostalgia for the less alienated life of the countryside is by no means a necessarily Left sentiment. In “Utopia as Replication” Jameson writes of Heidegger's disgust for the urban collectivity of modern life. According to Jameson, "This ideology expresses a horror of the new industrial city with its new working and white- collar classes, its mass culture and its public sphere, its standardization and its parliamentary systems; and it often implies a nostalgia for the older agriculturalist ways of life” (426). Might TCI's rejection of mass-based political movements and the modern metropolis, then, be read not necessarily (or at least not only) as a Left-wing position but also as a potentially reactionary one? That the industrial (and post-industrial) city may indeed contain elements of the dystopic is not a matter of dispute here. What matters is the political response to these industrial horrors. Of alienated life in the metropolis TCI writes, “It's a paradox that the places thought to be the most uninhabitable turn out to be the only ones still in some way inhabited. An old squatted shack still feels more lived in than the so-called luxury apartments” (TCI, 55). When in the name of an indictment of bourgeois decadence, TCI romanticizes poverty as somehow more authentic and alive than their bourgeois counterparts, it not only betrays a more rigorous understanding of alienated life under capitalism but also projects utopian desires backwards rather than towards a future free of poverty and precarity. Once again, the way out of the impasse of the present appears not as a dialectical transformation into the future but rather a regressive total destruction of “civilization” in favor of the more “authentic” life of the shantytown. In Destruction of Reason17 Lukács writes of Nietzsche's anti-civilization politics, for whom a revival of barbarity provides the only means of saving mankind. Lukács observes that “after subjective idealism and irrationalism had triumphed over Hegel, bourgeois philosophy became incapable of any dialectical linking of becoming and being, freedom and necessity; it could express their mutual relationship only as an insoluble antagonism or an eclectic amalgam.”18 TCI is equally incapable of such dialectical linking. The “eclectic amalgam” in the pages of TCI has produced a Frankenstein monster of contemporary American anti-civilization politics (of the likes of John Zerzan and Ted Kaczynski19) combined with French political thought (especially theories of the event) and interwar avant-garde ecstatic destruction – a theoretical deformity that is at turns both incomprehensible and inconsistent. Of its many inconsistencies TCI, like much contemporary political thought, is plagued by that supposedly indeterminate and problematic category: the human. According to TCI, on the one hand, civilization in its current form results in the total denial, or impossibility, of humanity – an analysis of alienation that seems to have much in common with the humanism of the young Marx in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. But, on the other hand, these elements of humanism in TCI are immediately negated by the enthusiasm with which the Invisible Committee greets catastrophe. In History and Class Consciousness20, Lukács makes an important distinction between Marxist and non-Marxist versions of humanism in terms of mediation. While many non-Marxists have recognized how capitalism violates the human, Marxist humanist positions, Lukács argues, must possess correct knowledge of the present so as not to mistake the symptom for the disease. "For otherwise, any description will inevitably succumb to the dilemmas of empiricism and utopianism, of voluntarism and fatalism, even though it may give an accurate account of matters of detail. At best it will not advance beyond crude facticity on the one hand, while on the other it will confront the immanent course of history with alien and hence subjective and arbitrary demands" (Lukács, 191). Following Lukács, it is possible to see how TCI may provide a compelling, if not graphic, description of the state of the world and yet fall short in its strategic response – offering only the arbitrary demand of insurrection which confronts history as something alien and thus beyond saving. Lukács rightly identifies the counter-revolutionary logic of such a position, which reproduces “the inhumanity of class society on a metaphysical and religious plane” (190). The ‘revolutionary’ utopianism of such views,” he claims, “cannot break out of the inner limits set to this undialectical ‘humanism'” (191). From nihilism to utopianism to “undialectical humanism,” accusing the theoretical framework of TCI of reactionary tendencies in terms of its arrested dialectics is perhaps overly uncharitable. The recent popular uprisings in the Arab World, Europe and now the United States may offer compelling examples of insurrectionary politics in action. The Invisible Committee's efforts to make comprehensible these insurrections and the forces they fight against is both politically necessary and intellectually admirable. The ability of these insurrectionary events to break from and reset the social and economic conditions of our world is still to be determined, but certainly these moments of rupture – the negating rage of the insurrectionary event as “propaganda by deed” – may yet hold the potential to coalesce into large-scale revolution. In that regard the political manifesto-as-field-guide that is TCI may prove timely and useful. But, if texts like TCI, masquerading as a break from the dead-end of anti-globalization utopianism, discourage thinking through the contradictions of the present, a present which necessarily by virtue of these contradictions offers, or at least motions towards, a way out, it provides little by way of a revolutionary strategy. More significantly perhaps, its political ambiguities may actually encourage it to drift into more reactionary, right-wing political territory, as we have seen lately with the rise of the anti-statist Tea Party movement in the U.S, and the right-wing libertarian threat to blow the Occupy impulse off course. Furthermore, TCI's anti-organizing attitude of invisibility risks digging its own grave in the form of the “commune,” which can do no more than attack and retreat before finally being quietly dealt with by the violence of the state. Invisibility might not be a strength after all. The way out of the impasse of the present moment is not through the dark corridors of insurrectionary nihilist-utopianism. While there is much to admire in TCI's attempt at a thorough diagnosis of the contemporary state of civilization, its failure to work through the contradictions of the present and thus to articulate a truly revolutionary praxis of not only negation but also dialectically mediated transformation, ultimately leaves it impotent to overcome the very crisis it aims to attack. Despite TCI's insistence to the contrary, the only solution to the crisis will have to be a social one.

### Cap K

#### 4. This shift to late modern capitalism and its attendant socio-political instability has rendered the coloniality framework of the 1ac fundamentally bankrupt.

Chibber 13 – Professor of sociology at NYU [Vivek, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital*, p. 293-296]

My argument amounts to the contention that postcolonial theory impedes the development of an adequate analysis of the modern epoch, whether in the East or the West. Is there any chance it will be displaced from its exalted status in the near future? Interestingly, if ever there was a time when the sheer force of events should suffice to undermine a theory, it is now. Two facts about the current conjuncture would seem to deliver a decisive and devastating blow to the postcolonial studies framework, while affirming the arguments I have leveled against it. The first of these is the global economic crisis that began in 2007-8, and the second is the series of revolts in the Middle East known as the Arab Spring.

The global economic crisis has brought into relief the basic fact that the entire world is now part of the same universal history, subject to the same underlying forces. There is no more dramatic illustration of capitals universalization than the fact that the entire world has been engulfed by its effects. This is not the first time this has happened, of course. Crises in the history of capitalism have always been global in their impact. But it is the first time such a cataclysm has hit since post­colonial theory arrived on the scene. For the first time since the 1980s, everyone is talking about capitalism – not alterity, or hybridity, or the fragment, but the ubiquitous, grinding, crushing force of capital. This certainly makes for a friendlier environment for the arguments I have been developing in this book, and which others will no doubt make in the years to come.

Even more devastating than the economic collapse, however, is the Arab Spring. It is hard to imagine a more dramatic confirmation of the two universalisms than the demands that came from the streets of Tunisia, Egypt, or the other centers of revolt. These were demands for bread, rights, jobs, and democracy. In fact, without exception, commentators were taken aback by the centrality of secular, universalistic, and materialist demands in the movements. This is not the first time such demands have been seen in the Middle East; secular nationalism was the main political ideology of the region in the middle decades of the twentieth century. But since the 1970s, it was Islamists of varying stripes that had gained traction within civil society. The growth of religious political organizations, and the steady enervation of secular Left forces, had been one of the conditions that lent credibility to the new Orientalism espoused by postcolonial theory. Yet when the Springs mass movements exploded onto the scene, the Islamists were largely marginal to them. Their banners were hard to find.5 What the masses of young revolutionaries called for was liberty, justice, and dignity – demands one should expect, if postcolonial theory is to be believed, only in the streets of Paris or New York. And if that were not enough, when the United States and Europe experienced a series of mass mobilizations against austerity during the months after the Arab Spring, the youth in the streets of Barcelona, New York, and Athens carried signs saluting their counterparts in Cairo and Tunis, citing them as inspirations. How could this be? How could calls for jobs and rights in the West take inspiration from the Orient, if the latter are not even supposed to be motivated by such matters?

Hence, one can make the argument that the past five years have created optimal conditions for the recognition of postcolonial theory’s shortcomings. But will it be displaced? In fact, I doubt we will witness its eclipse anytime in the near future. Postcolonial theory came to prominence during a period of massive political defeats for the Left, all across the world.6 Indeed, I rather doubt there has ever been a time since the birth of the modern Left that its forces were as enfeebled as they have been since the 1980s. It is now a commonplace that the turn to irrationalism within the self-styled “radical” intelligentsia was very closely tied to their retreat into the academy.7 But it was not just that this brought about a change in intellectual culture, narrowly conceived. Over the past quarter century, enormous resources have been sunk into the material infrastructure that sustains the theory. There are journals wholly committed to it, chairs in humanities departments dedicated to its propagation, sections in disciplinary societies that convene annually with hundreds of attendees, book series at publishing houses with enormous lists and promises of forthcoming volumes. None of this will come to an end anytime soon simply because the theory happens to be deeply flawed.

And this brings up the second obstacle. By now, not only have lavish material resources been plowed into the field, but hundreds of scholars have built their reputations on it. This institutional network is staffed by academics whose professional life now orbits around the ideas propagated by the theory. Apart from the first generation of postcolonial theorists, the second generation, their students, constitutes a bulwark against the possibility of critique – and hence the possibility of one’s own reputation becoming sullied. For scholars from the Global South, who have now for decades promoted the Orientalism central to postcolonial theory, the prospect of exposure is especially devastating. There are now legions of intellectuals who have staked their reputations on this theoretical framework, who have made their careers on extolling its virtues and its deep insights. Put these factors together, and one should expect that the response to the political developments of the past couple of years will be twofold: to bend and twist the theory so that it might appear capable of accommodating developments that rather directly undermine its basic propositions; and to violently attack any concerted critique issuing from the outside.

For those familiar with the literature on the history of science, my prognosis ought not to come as a surprise. Decades ago, Thomas Kuhn described the process of theoretical development in the history of scientific thought.8 He showed that when scientific theories meet with empirical anomalies or even outright disconfirmation, they are not easily displaced by their rivals. They are able to survive for long periods, in large part because of the resources that can be deployed to defend them, and because the reputations of so many scientists hang on the success of the flawed theories. What I have described in the case of postcolonial theory is much the same phenomenon, except that it is occurring in the moral sciences. If anything, the absence of experimental conditions, along with the more dubious intellectual culture of the social sciences and humanities, makes the likelihood of rapid displacement even more remote.

None of this is to suggest, however, that the situation is hopeless. Quite the contrary. The times in which we live do offer a tremendous opportunity to expose the flaws of the theory and even to displace it. My point is simply that if this is going to happen, it will not happen on its own. It will take some time and a great deal of effort. All the more reason to begin now.

#### 5. Settler Colonial Studies Link – heralding settler colonialism as a distinct field misapprehends power as separate from postcolonial capitalism – systems of trade established during the British Empire explain erasure of native legal systems.

Bhandar 16 (Brenna, Senior Lecturer in Law at SOAS, Acts and Omissions: Framing Settler Colonialism in Palestine Studies, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/23569/acts-and-omissions_framing-settler-colonialism-in->;)

Settler Colonialism and Racial Capitalism

The forging of a new academic field of settler colonial studies risks potentially creating unnecessary binaries between studies of colonialism and settler-colonialism. It is clear that techniques of colonial dispossession traveled throughout networks of trade and leisure established during and throughout the British Empire. Such tools include the surveillance and criminalization of colonized populations, land appropriation, resource extraction, the perversion or indeed, attempted erasure, of native legal systems, and control over the mobility and political citizenship of colonized populations. English colonial administrators and freelance entrepreneurs traveled, during the nineteenth century, between the Indian subcontinent, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Caribbean, the United States, the African continent, and of course the United Kingdom. They imported and exported the legal and political infrastructures required for colonial modes of expropriation. With the advent of the Mandate system, Palestine became another scene of exchange and implementation of European colonial modes of governance tested elsewhere. While many scholars have revealed the formative influence of European models of nationalism and colonial ideology on early Zionist movements (Raz-Krakotzkin 2007; Lloyd 2012), the detailed work of excavating the way in which the political and legal techniques of dispossession travelled between different colonial sites remains underexplored. (Although see Lowe, 2014 an Saldaña-Portillo 2016 for exemplary exceptions to this claim). Another binary inherent to the settler colonial analytic is that between the colonizer and colonized. While adopting a settler colonial framework is critical to analyzing Israel’s modus operandi as a colonial power, there is a need to contextualize Israel’s settler colonial project within the particular class and racial differences inside Israel and amongst Palestinians. Ella Shohat’s critical work on the racial hierarchy within Israel’s settler society is a strong example that highlights the historical marginalization of the Mizrahim, Jews of Arab origin. Racialized immigrants occupy both the position of settler in relation to Indigenous communities and the subaltern in relation to the dominant place of the white European settler. Some scholars in North America, and particularly in Hawai’i have grasped how the racialization of particular immigrant communities in settler states complicates the settler colonial framework. On the other hand, a settler colonial framework must also contend with the emerging class differences in Palestinian society exacerbated by the impact of the Oslo Accords. This is especially relevant when contending with the question of how Palestinians can challenge the logic of the Oslo process while the Palestinian Authority, adhering to a fundamental neoliberal agenda (Hanieh 2013), remains intact. The Palestinian Authority continues to formulate Palestinian liberation in terms of truncated statehood on small sections of Palestinian land and celebrates symbolic acts such as raising the Palestinian flag at the United Nations while prospects of Palestinian sovereignty over land continue to diminish daily. Sadly, the PA’s focus continues to be building a neoliberal state apparatus as a way to “convince” Israel and international donors that Palestinians are able to run their affairs. For all intents and purposes, Israel has succeeded in outsourcing its military occupation to a segment of Palestinians - this is evident in the relatively large budgets of the security forces of the PA and the continued security coordination with Israel. In our view, such differences within both the settler society and the colonized need to be brought out and fully incorporated into the settler colonial analytical framework. Racially inscribed dispossession and the capitalist modes of accumulation that subtend expropriative practices have developed in spatially and temporally differentiated ways in the colonies, as elaborated by scores of post-colonial theorists. In other words, capitalist development in the colonies has not mirrored the transition from feudal economies to capitalist ones in Europe. The terms “postcolonial capitalism” and “racial capitalism” both denote ways of understanding capitalist forms of dispossession that profit from, and reinforce class hierarchies, patriarchal formations, and racist ideologies lodged in colonial imaginaries that persist into the present. These terms do not neatly fit into a settler-colonial framework and yet are critical to understanding the political-economic, juridical and social complexities across various sites of inquiry. Forcing them into a single analytical category risks losing this richness and undermining forms of political solidarity across colonized spaces. Darwish’s masterful poem, “The Red Indian’s Penultimate Speech to the White Man” begins with an epigram from the Duwamish Chief Seattle. The dispossession of native land that Columbus’ ill-fated voyage inaugurated, binds together the fates of Native Americans and Palestinians, who resist colonial dominance over land, time, history, memory, and place. As Chief Seattle asserts, “there is no Death here, there is only the change of worlds.” We in turn are looking for our own counter-narration, a language to explain the ongoing violence of dispossession in multiple contexts. We are reminded of the words of Mike Krebs and Dana Olwan: We want to build solidarity without reproducing and enacting the same colonial logics and asymmetric relationships of power on which settler colonialisms hinge. We believe that our futures are connected and that we are especially powerful when we enact solidarity by words and actions. To expect solidarity, we must be willing to give it, share it, and maintain it. To do otherwise is to risk producing solidarity on the very colonial terms that our movements seek to challenge and undo.

#### Gagne is a defense of using aesthetics as a means of promoting resistance---that fails. It devolves into gesticulative politics that does nothing to actualize change, proves it’s a link, not a link turn.

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This tendency finds inspiration in the early Situationist accounts of the creation of situations. For example, the "Report on the Construction of Situations" described "the Situationist game" as "taking a stand in favor of what will bring about the future reign of freedom and play,"37 and "Preliminary Problems in Constructing Situations," explains that until "the collective takeover of the world" there will be "no real individuals" so meanwhile we can "promote the experimental game of revolution," by "raising at a few points the incendiary beacon heralding a greater game."38 It is not surprising that for later readers who are immersed in the dominant consumer culture and cut off from living radical and revolutionary traditions, this ludic and harmlessly iconoclastic aspect will resonate, while the Situationist political project will fail to register. For these neo- Situationists a detached aesthetic perspective seems eminently cool while a politically engaged one leaves them cold.

Neo-Situationist aestheticism goes as far as possible to turn the movement's (at least momentarily) engaged politics of social subversion into a permanent politics of the gesture. It reduces radical critique and détournement to forms of ridiculing the dominant culture. Yet, the dominant culture already ridicules itself mercilessly, so this blends easily into the perpetual recurrence of the same. In the end, the Situationist game becomes a contest for the accumulation of countercultural capital. Along these lines, Critchley depicts a "mannerist Situationism" in which "détournement is replayed as obsessively planned re-enactment."39 He imagines a neo-Situationist performance piece in which "one does not engage in a bank heist: one reenacts Patty Hearst's adventures with the Symbionese Liberation Army in a warehouse in Brooklyn, or whatever."40 This is the ultimate postmodern nightmare. Situationism is dissolved into the ubiquitous Whateverism.

But one does not have to resort to imaginary scenarios to depict the way in which Situationism lends itself to trendy co-optation. The paradigm case of assimilation of Situationists into a counter-spectacle is Greil Marcus's Lipstick Traces, the work that also does the most to glamorize the movement. Marcus typifies the Situationist project as a quest for "absolute freedom," which he calls "the fire around which the dadaists and Debord's strangely fecund groups held their dances, and which consumed them."41 Delving more deeply into the little-known history of strange fecundity, he explains that it was also "the prize seized by the Cathars, [END PAGE 225] the Brethren of the Free Spirit, the Lollards, John of Leyden, the Ranters, and Adolf Hitler: the end of the world."42 Finally, Marcus proclaims, in a formulation that is rather contorted even for him, that this prize "can be heard [sic] in the words [the Situationists] left behind because of the noise the Sex Pistols made."43 Yes, it turns out that the fire of absolute freedom burned most intensely in the musical efforts of the Sex Pistols, and, indeed, did so "far more than in their precursors' writing."44 So the Situationists, along with the Dadaists and Medieval millenarians, all become precursors of Sid Vicious, and can in a certain sense bask retroactively in his reflected glory. In this way, Marcus dissolves the actual project of the Situationists into a vague essence whose secret history can be traced (at least by the right kind of journalistic cultural historian) from medieval mystical anarchists right down to Hitler and the Sex Pistols.45

#### 5. Debate is distinct from academia, in that deliberation starts with the timer and ends with the ballot. Impacts about debate and the assumption the ballot has political force to remedy the aff is bourgeois ideology – to think that ballots in Round 5 of the Harvard Tournament changes material outcomes is inseparable from magical voluntarism

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic intensification . . . of appeals to enchantment,’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist—welling up close to its core’’ (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno, ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. Such ideology explodes in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133).What the Comaroffs point to is not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is presumably the age of cynical reason (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987). As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the idea of communication (see Peters, 1999), we have been particularly prone to a philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language). Going well beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions in transforming the world around us, what we are calling magical voluntarism fosters a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in her own interests. Furthermore, magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and thought alone fail to shift existing social relations. In popular culture, magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and DVD The Secret (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts. That includes all great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist’’ typified by the raging success of The Secret (see McGee, 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world. Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates, magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of reality. We argue that the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted The Secret’s millions of readers. Below we advance a conception of agency as an open question in order to combat magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classical Marxism), we are mutually opposed to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in Run Lola Run,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of practical reason (phronesis) that is increasingly discredited among a number rhetorical scholars. We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide . . . agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency . . . [which] opens up opportunities for innovating . . . in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’ (p. 33). The idea that one can choose an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.

#### Our alternative is to build solidarity around anti-capitalist demands to build a better future---solves all impacts.

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Utopia-Back by Popular Demand

The Leap is part of a shift in the political zeitgeist, as many are realizing that the future depends on our ability to come together [END PAGE 252] across painful divides, and to take leadership from those who traditionally have been most excluded. We have reached the limits of siloed politics, where everyone fights in their own corner without mapping the connections between various struggles, and without a clear idea of the concepts and values that must form the moral foundation of the future we need.

That recognition doesn't mean that resisting the very specific attacks-on families, on people's bodies, on communities, on individual rights-is suddenly optional. There is no choice but to resist, just as there is no choice but to run insurgent progressive candidates at every level of government, from federal down to the local school board. In the months and years to come, the various resistance tactics described in this book are going to be needed more than ever: the street protests, the strikes, the court challenges, the sanctuaries, the solidarity across divisions of race, gender, and sexual identity-all are going to be essential. And we will need to continue pushing institutions to divest from the industries that profit off various forms of dispossession, from fossil fuels to prisons to war and occupation. And yet even if every one of these resistance fights is victorious-and we know that's not going to be possible-we would still be standing in the same place we were before the Far Right started surging, with no better chance of addressing the root causes of the systemic crises of which Trump is but one virulent symptom.

A great many of today's movement leaders and key organizers understand this well, and are planning and acting accordingly. Alicia Garza, one of the founders of Black Lives Matter, said on the eve of Trump's inauguration that after five years of swelling social movements,

whether it be Occupy Wall Street, whether it be the DREAMers movement or Black Lives Matter ... there's a particular hope that I have that all of those movements will join together to become [END PAGE 253] the powerful force that we can be, that will actually govern this country. So that's what I'm focused on, and I hope that everybody else is thinking about that too.

Many people are, and as they do, we're seeing a rekindling of the kind of utopian dreaming that has been sorely missing from social movements in recent decades. More and more frequently, immediate, pressing demands-a $15-an-hour living wage, an end to police killings and deportations, a tax on carbon-are being paired with calls for a future that is not just better than a violent, untenable present, but ... wonderful.

In the United States, the boldest and most inspiring example of this new utopianism is the Vision for Black Lives, a sweeping policy platform released in the summer of 2016 by the Movement for Black Lives. Born of a coalition of over fifty Black-led organizations, the platform states, "We reject false solutions and believe we can achieve a complete transformation of the current systems, which place profit over people and make it impossible for many of us to breathe." It goes on to place police shootings and mass incarceration in the context of an economic system that has waged war on Black and brown communities, putting them first in line for lost jobs, hacked-back social services, and environmental pollution. The result has been huge numbers of people exiled from the formal economy, preyed upon by increasingly militarized police, and warehoused in overcrowded prisons. And the platform makes a series of concrete proposals, including defunding prisons, removing police from schools, and demilitarizing police. It also lays out a program for reparations for slavery and systemic discrimination, one that includes free college education and forgiveness of student loans. There is much more-nearly forty policy demands in all, spanning changes to the tax code to breaking up the banks. The Atlantic magazine remarked that the platform -which was dropped smack in the middle of the [END PAGE 254] US presidential campaign- "rivals even political-party platforms in thoroughness."

In the months after Trump's inauguration, the Movement for Black Lives played a central role in deepening connections with other movements, convening dozens of groups under the banner "The Majority." The new formation kicked off with a thrilling month-long slate of actions between April 4 (the anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King's assassination) and May Day. Nationwide "Fight Racism, Raise Pay" protests linked racial justice to the fast-growing workers' campaign for a $15 minimum wage and the mounting attacks on immigrants. "In the context of Trump's presidency," the new coalition argues, "it is imperative that we put forth a true, collective vision of economic justice and worker justice, for all people."

And in June 2017, thousands of activists from diverse constituencies are descending on Chicago for the second annual People's Summit, organized by National Nurses United, to continue hashing out a broad-based "People's Agenda." Several similar state-level convergences are also under way, in Michigan as well as North Carolina, where "Moral Mondays" have been bringing movements together for several years. As one of its founders, Reverend William Barber, has said, "You have to build a movement, not a moment ... I believe all these movements--Moral Mondays, Fight for $15, Black Lives Matter are signs of hope that people are going to stand up and not stand down."

As it has in Canada, the climate crisis is pushing us to put plans for political transformation on a tight and unyielding deadline. A powerful and broad coalition called New York Renews is pushing hard for the state to transition entirely to renewable energy

by 2050. If more US states adopt these kinds of ambitious targets, and other countries do the same (Sweden, for instance, has a target of carbon neutrality by 2045), then [END PAGE 255] Trump and Tillerson's most nefarious efforts may be insufficient to tip the planet into climate chaos.

It's becoming possible to see a genuine path forward-new political formations that, from their inception, will marry the fight for economic fairness with a deep analysis of how racism and misogyny are used as potent tools to enforce a system that further enriches the already obscenely wealthy on the backs of both people and the planet. Formations that could become home to the millions of people who are engaging in activism and organizing for the first time, knitting together a multiracial and intergenerational coalition bound by a common transformational project.

The plans that are taking shape for defeating Trumpism wherever we live go well beyond finding a progressive savior to run for office and then offering that person our blind support. Instead, communities and movements are uniting to lay out the core policies that politicians who want their support must endorse.

The people's platforms are starting to lead-and the politicians will have to follow.